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Intellectual Property, Human Rights &
Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law
Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge
and the Conservation of Biodiversity
ROSEMARY J. COOMBE*
INTRODUCTION
What would it mean to recognize intellectual property rights as international
human rights? This is a speculative question because although there is a case
to be made that intellectual property rights (IPRs) are already human rights,
they are rarely approached in this fashion, either by governments or by the
holders of such rights. By situating intellectual property in the human rights
framework, we may consider some of the challenges that full recognition of
intellectual property as a human right would pose. Conflicts over the meaning
and location of culture create fundamental ambiguities with respect to the scope
of intellectual property protections. An examination of recent controversies
over the use of IPRs to protect indigenous knowledge and as a means to
implement provisions ofthe Convention on Biological Diversity will illustrate
the point and demonstrate the limitations of traditional understandings of
sovereignty. The recognition of PRs as human rights entails a renewed concern
for social justice issues in an era of so-called global harmonization of
intellectual property protections that further challenges our considerations of
sovereignty.
The international human rights framework is unfamiliar for many
intellectual property scholars, so I will summarily present the necessary legal
scaffolding for building the argument. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) is the most general embodiment of today's international human
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rights norms. Its provisions have been incorporated into national constitutions,
regional conventions, and international covenants-the most important of which
are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' (CCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2 (CESCR).
Intellectual property occupies an ambiguous status in terms of these rights
categories, insofar as the right to property is protected under the CCPR,
whereas "the [author's] right to benefit from the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production,"3
is one of the cultural rights enshrined in the CESCR. Moreover, intellectual
properties of cultural significance to minority groups may be seen as aspects of
the right to cultural identity under the CCPR, which further complicates their
status. Nonetheless, such categorical ambiguities should not be great cause for
concern; the United Nations has repeatedly stated that the two sets of rights are
interdependent and indivisible, and most contemporary commentators agree that
the distinctions between the categories have been overstated! Although
economic, social, and cultural rights have been juridically marginalized in
comparison to civil and political rights, both in terms of the institutional
frameworks developed for their implementation and in terms of their judicial
interpretation,5 failure to monitor the violation of economic, social, and cultural
rights has less to do with the legal obligations established by the CESCR than
with political problems of resolve.,
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CESCR].
3. Id. at art. 15.
4. See, e.g., PAUL HUNT, RECLAIMING SOCIAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES (1996); J. Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale, "The Personal is Political", or Why Women's
Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 691
(1995); Asbjorn Eide & Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CuLTuRAL RIGHTs: A TEXTBOOK 15-19 (Eide et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter
TEXTBOOK]; Asbjorm Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights [hereinafter Eide], in
TEXTBOOK, supra at 21-40; Allan Rosas, So-Called Rights of the Third Generation, in TEXTBOOK, supra at
243-45; G.J.H. van Hoof, The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Rebuttal of Some
Traditional Views, in THE RIGHTTO FOOD 97 (Philip Alston & K. Tomasevski eds., 1984); INTERNATIONAL
HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLTCS, MORALS (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996).
5. Bruno Simma suggests that "there hardly exists another human rights treaty which has been more
frequently misinterpreted, downplayed or intentionally abused than the International Covenant of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights." Bruno Simma, The Implementation of the International Covenant ofEconomic,
Social and Cultural Rights, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTs: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTs 79 (1991).
6. Scott Leckie, Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20(1) HuM. RTs. Q. 81, 82 (1998).
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The idea that there are two categories of rights originated in the 1966
United Nations General Assembly adoption of the two discrete Covenants: one
dealing with civil and political rights and another dealing with economic, social,
and cultural rights. This twofold division originated in a controversial 1951
decision of the United Nations General Assembly. The States of the Soviet
Bloc are widely believed to have championed economic, social, and cultural
rights, while Western nations put emphasis on the civil and political rights that
guaranteed civil liberties. However, even this dichotomy is misleading.
"[I]nternational second-generation rights" in fact have Western origins in:
President Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms Address" in 1941, his proposal for an
"Economic Bill of Rights" in 1944, and the American Law Institute's draft
international bill of rights that same year.7
According to Philip Alston, the Cold War "changed what was a rational and
balanced debate between 1944 and 1947 (culminating in the adoption of the
Universal Declaration) into a struggle that encouraged the taking of extreme
positions and prevented objective consideration of the key issues raised by the
concept of economic and social rights."' Ideological conflict created the
perception of two discrete kinds of rights. The Cold War also had implications
for policymaking at national levels, chilling the introduction of economic, social,
and cultural rights in much domestic legislation.'
The decision to divide the two sets of rights into separate covenants was
predicated on a number of assumptions, many of which are now considered
questionable. Civil and political rights were believed to be "absolute" and
"immediate," whereas economic, social, and cultural rights were considered
more "programmatic,"--they could be and would have to be realized gradually;
hence, they were not viewed as rights in the same sense.1" Similarly, civil and
political rights were deemed "justiciable" in that they could be more easily
applied by courts and other tribunals, whereas economic, social, and cultural
rights were more political in nature. In retrospect, it appears that these
assumptions were overstated, misleading, or mistaken and that there are
substantial similarities pertaining to State obligations with respect to both
7. HuNT, supra note 4, at 4.
8. Philip Alston, Economic andSocialRights, in HuMAN RIGM: ANAGENDA FORTHENExTCENTURY
137, 152 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994).
9. Id.
10. Eide, in TEXTBOOK, supra note 4, at 22 (citing G. E. W. Vierdag, The Legal Nature of the Rights
Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 NETH. J. OF lINT'L L. 103
(1978)).
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groups of rights." In fact, of the almost 120 States that have ratified the
CCPR, only two-the United States and Haiti-have failed to also ratify the
CESCR, and overall, more States have ratified the latter.
While resistance to particular rights may be found in many societies, the
tendency in both Western and non-Western societies has been toward a greater
integration of the rights that are internationally recognized. For example, in
later human rights instruments, such as the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, social, economic, cultural, civil, and political
rights are not separated, but combined. 2  Furthermore, in 1993,
"representatives of 171 governments assembled in Vienna at the World
Conference of Human Rights and reiterated that all human rights are universal,
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated."' 3
The "revitalization" of the CESCR since the mid-i 980s may, according to
Mathew Craven, "be indirectly attributed to the end of the ideological
confrontation between East and West."'4 In the last decade, we have seen
renewed interest in these rights at international, national, regional, and local
levels. This renewed interest may also be motivated by increased recognition
that structural adjustment policies, global capital restructuring, and the opening
of markets are creating new pressures and new needs for economic, social, and
cultural rights protections. The incorporation of IPRs under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 5 and the
purview of the World Trade Organization (WTO) may provide further reasons
for States to consider their obligations with respect to intellectual property
rights as cultural rights recognized within a human rights framework. To the
extent that we have seen rights to intellectual property entrenched and expanded
internationally, it is even more important to ensure that those rights are
exercised in a fashion congruent with international human rights norms.
In a recent overview, Scott Leckie argues that the permeable nature of many
11. Id. at23.
12. See id. at 24.
13. Id. (citing The World Conference on Human Rights: The Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, pt. 1, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993)).
14. M. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A
PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 352 (1995).
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
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human rights "should have long ago laid to rest sentiments divorcing, rather
than merging, civil, cultural, economic, political, and social human rights."'6
Given that civil and political rights have socioeconomic dimensions, and that
social, economic, and cultural rights have significant civil and political
implications, and that violations of one form of right may often be formulated
as violations of the other, "the continued categorization of rights is a flawed
approach to understanding or interpreting human rights law and related
violations thereof."'7 Paul Hunt argues that these are compelling arguments
supported by international and national jurisprudence and that such an
integrated approach to human rights protection should be internationally
embraced. 8 How, then, might intellectual property rights be approached if we
were to give institutional weight to this proposition?
I. IPRS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING PROCESS
IPRs are most clearly referred to in Article 15 of the CESCR as one of the
four cultural rights that are to be respected with regard to three proscribed
undertakings. It provides as follows:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone:
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
16. Leckie, supra note 6, at 104.
17. Id.
18. See generally HUNT, supra note 4 (advocating a revised analytical approach for international human
rights law by considering socioeconomic, cultural, political and civil rights simultaneously). See also the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights summary, where it is noted that:
[T]he undertaking to take steps ... by all appropriate means... neither requires nor
precludes any particular form of government or economic system being used.... In this
regard, the Committee reaffirms that the rights recognized in the Covenant are
susceptible to realization within the context of a wide variety of economic and political
systems, provided only that the interdependence and indivisibility of the two sets of
human rights, as affirmed inter alia in the preamble to the Covenant, is recognized and
reflected in the system in question.
U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 5th Sess., 8, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1990/SR.28
(1990).
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production of which he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present
Covenant to achieve full realization of this right shall include
those necessary for the conservation, the development and the
diffusion of science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and
creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
benefits to be derived from the encouragement and
development of international contacts and co-operation in the
scientific and cultural fields. 9
These cultural rights have not received a great deal of either judicial or
academic attention and as a consequence their scope remains unclear. As
Asbjorn Eide suggests, cultural rights appear at the end of the rights enumerated
in both the UDHR and the CESCR and "appear almost as a remnant
category," 2 0-a marginalization that is reflected both in human rights practice
and its theory.
Most States party to the CESCR (State parties) report developments in
intellectual property protections pursuant to their reporting obligations under
the CESCR (rather than under the CCPR), which would indicate that there is
an international practice and potentially a customary norm ofrecognizing IPRs
as cultural rights in international human rights law." However, State parties
19. CESCR, supra note 2.
20. Asbjern Eide, Cultural Rights as Individual Human Rights [hereinafter Eide, Cultural Rights], in
TEXTBOOK, supra note 4, at 229, 229.
21. As an historical note, Asbjorn Eide mentions that:
One of the cultural rights mentioned, namely the right to benefit from the protection of
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which the beneficiary is the author, is closely related to the right to
property. That right, however, is not included in the two Covenants but it is contained
in Article 17 of the UDHR. When Article 27 of the UDHR was negotiated, controversy
arose over the inclusion of the right to benefit from the moral and material interests of
the author. Some members of the Commission on Human Rights argued that it was not
a right applicable to everyone, adding that it also felt that patents and copyrights could
sometimes become an obstacle to the possibility for others to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications. In the end, however, it was included.
Id at 232-33 (citing ALBERTVERDOODT, NAISSANCEETSIGNIFICATION DE LADtCIARATON UNIVERSELLE DES
DRorrS DEL'HOMME 245-256 (1964). Eide notes that there already existed international agreements protecting
international cultural cooperation and the preservation of cultural heritage; thus he doubts that anything new
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do not seem to report intellectual property developments in a fashion that
adequately relates the State's progress in securing IPRs with its other
obligations under the CESCR.22 Under Article 15(2) of the CESCR, the steps
taken by the State party to respect IPRs "shall include those necessary for the
conservation, the development, and the diffusion of science and culture."23
Thus, the conservation of culture is an end to be achieved through intellectual
property, and so is its diffusion. This is consistent with an understanding of
works of culture as being both individually created and socially shared. Indeed,
most IPR regimes are predicated upon a social obligation to make works
publicly available, although increasingly at prices set by the market or by
negotiated tariffs.
When reporting to the Committee on its realization of rights under Article
15, the State is asked to describe measures adopted to realize "the right of
everyone to take part in the cultural life which he or she considers pertinent, and
to manifest his or her own culture."24 More specifically, the State is asked to
provide information about measures taken to further the enjoyment of the
cultural heritage of indigenous peoples, the preservation of "mankind's cultural
heritage," and other measures taken for "the conservation and development of
culture."25 The State must detail measures taken to ensure the application of
scientific progress "for the benefit of everyone, including measures aimed at the
preservation of mankind's natural heritage and at promoting a healthy and pure
environment and information on the institutional infrastructures established for
that purpose." 6 Any particular difficulties faced by indigenous groups must be
reported.
Finally, State parties must report measures to prevent the use of scientific
and technical progress for purposes that are contrary to the enjoyment of human
rights.27 The State party is asked to describe measures taken to realize the right
of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests
was added to existing international law by either Article 27(2) of the UDHR or 15(IXc) of the CESCR. He
does not further explore the possibility that these rights must be implemented in a fashion that is congruent with
other human rights obligations.
22. See, e.g., The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, October 1997, Dept.
of Canadian Heritage, 3rd Report of Canada.
23. Eide, Cultural Rights, in TEXTBOOK, supra note 4, at 233.
24. Revised Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Reports to be Submitted by States Parties
Under Articles 16 and 17 of the ICESCR, U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U..N. Doc. E/1992/23.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
1998]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic work, including the protection
of intellectual property resulting from such activities." State parties must
describe the systems in place to ensure respect for and protection of freedom
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity, along with "measures
taken to guarantee the freedom of exchange of scientific, technical, and cultural
information, views and experience between scientists, writers, creative workers,
artists and other creative individuals and their respective institutions."29
A closer examination of State obligations with respect to cultural rights
reveals a set of obligations that go far beyond merely reporting legislative
developments." States' obligations under the CESCR are found primarily in
Article 2.1 and the various General Comments issued by the Committee each
year." States obligate themselves under the CESCR to take steps with a view
to progressively achieving the rights, including the adoption of legal measures:
The adoption of such legislation constitutes a process of
positivization of economic, social and cultural rights at the
national level. The transformation of econonic, social and
cultural rights into positive law, whether in constitutions or in
statutory law, is, however, not enough. The rights must be
realized in fact, which may require comprehensive
administrative measures and social action.32
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Committee) has been
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Leckie, supra note 6, at 90 (citing as an example The Nature of States Parties Obligations, U.N.
ESCOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, Annex Ill, at 83, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1990/8 (1990)). See also Matthew C.R.
Craven, The Domestic Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
XL NETH. INT'L L. REv. 367 (1993); Mario Gomez, Social Economic Rights and Human Rights
Commissions, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 155 (1995).
31. Article 2.1 provides that:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical,
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
CESCR, supra note 2, at 5. See generally Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States
Parties' Obligations Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM.
RTS. Q. 156 (1987); Asbjorn Eide, Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold
Approach, 10 HUM. Rrs. L. J. 35 (1989).
32. Eide, in TEXTBOOK, supra note 4, at 30.
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instrumental in promoting greater attention to the CESCR within the United
Nations. Social, cultural, and economic rights issues have also been addressed
with increasing frequency by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Four other United Nations
agencies are important in the CESCR's implementation: the International
Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 33
Pursuant to Article 16, State parties "undertake to submit in conformity
with this part of the Covenant reports on the measures which they have adopted
and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized
herein."34 General Comments are issued regularly to clarify articles of the
Covenant and State obligations.35
In its 1989 General Comment, the Committee asserted that the reason for
filing country reports is to ensure that the State party monitors each right to
determine if these rights are being enjoyed by all individuals.36 Monitoring
provides a basis for policy formation once shortcomings in individual enjoyment
of rights are identified. This is the obligation to take steps by all appropriate
means-to develop and adopt a plan of action. Ideally, the Committee
welcomes public scrutiny of government policies and public involvement in the
reporting process so that shortcomings in rights protection are brought to
government attention for inclusion in the State report. Thus, interested non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are allowed to make submissions to the
Committee whenever they have evidence, for example, that IPRs are being
exercised in a fashion that is incongruent with other human rights norms.
Rights and duties are integrally related, as Asbjorn Eide suggests. Under
international law, States have obligations for human rights, and State duties are
clarified incrementally by way of additional, more specific instruments, and
33. See Philip Alston, MAKING AND BREAKING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE UN's SPECIALIZEDAGENCIES AND
IMPLEMENTATION OFTHE INTERNATIONALCOVENANTON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (1979),
reprinted as Philip AIston, The United Nations' Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79 (1979).
More recently, see Philip Alston, The United Nations' Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1157 (1995).
34. CESCR, supra note 2, at 51.
35. See The Purpose of General Comments, U.N. ESCOR, 3d. Sess., Supp. No.4, Annex 111, at 87, U.N.
Doc. E/1989/22.
36. Id.
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through the practice of monitoring bodies." When States give effect to these
obligations in national law, they must impose duties on persons subject to their
jurisdiction. The States' obligations to protect involve duties to prevent abuse
of rights by third parties, including non-State actors, whereas obligations to
fulfill involve active duties to take appropriate measures that create a
framework for determining accountability. When considering potential victims
of violations, "the Committee has recognized that both individuals and groups
can be subjected to violations of economic, social, and cultural rights."3s State
obligations include:
[T]he protection of the freedom of action and the use of
resources against other, more assertive or aggressive subjects
and more powerful economic interests, protection against
fraud, against unethical behaviour in trade and contractual
relations, against the marketing and dumping of hazardous or
dangerous products. This protective function of the State is
also the most important aspect of State obligations with regard
to economic, social, and cultural rights, and it is similar to the
role of the State as protector of civil and political rights.39
Questions as to when and whether a State is in violation of economic, social,
and cultural rights are addressed by the Limburg Principles on the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.4"
In addition to active denials of economic, social and cultural
rights by states, omissions such as persistent deficiencies of
due diligence, failures to act in accordance with prescribed
legal obligations, failures to fulfill obligations of an immediate
nature, and the prevailing absence of obligatory legal measures
or remedial mechanisms also represent very common types of
37. Eide, in TEXTBOOK, supra note 4, at 35.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 37.
40. Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
CulturalRights, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 43d Sess., Agenda Items 8,18, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex (1987), reprinted in 9 HUM. RTs. Q. 122 (1987); For a discussion of its import, see
David L. Martin, The Limburg Principles Turn Ten: An Impact Assessment (unpublished document referred
to in Leckie, supra note 6, at 89).
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violations of economic, social and cultural rights. States may
commit further violations by failing to monitor the degree to
which the rights established under the [CESCR] are enjoyed or
neglecting to adopt clearly defined programs toward their
implementation. Additional violations through acts of
omission include failure to prevent discrimination, failure to
intervene in social or other situations manifestly inconsistent
with legal obligations, failure to undertake all necessary and
reasonable measures to protect individuals against potential or
real harm by other individuals, and general state failures to
implement positive obligations.4"
A 1993 resolution of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights urged
member States "to consider identifying specific national benchmarks designed
to give effect to the minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of
minimum essential levels of each of the [economic, social, and cultural]
rights."42
The State is not the only potential violator of economic, social, and cultural
rights. Other entities are capable of injuring the enjoyment of such rights.
Third parties may possess fewer obligations than States, but they are
accountable to States who havejurisdiction over them and are not immune from
duties afforded to both individuals and groups under international human rights
law. States are obliged "to ensure compliance with international obligations by
private persons and [have] an obligation to prevent violations by them. 43 For
example, an Inter-American Court of Human Rights case held that States are
obliged not only to prevent, investigate, and punish any human rights violation
carried out by acts of public authority, but they must also show the same
diligence with respect to acts of private persons," which would include legal
persons. This was recently reaffirmed with respect to the violation of economic,
social, and cultural rights by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Impunity for Human Rights Violations, who stressed in 1996 that private
individuals can perpetrate violations of such rights.4 Leckie suggests that this
41. Leckie, supra note 6, at 98.
42. U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1993/14.
43. Leckie, supra note 6, at 109 (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 435
(4th ed. 1990)).
44. See Case 7920, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 35, OEA/ser. LJV/Ill.19, doc.13 at 71 (1988).
45. See Second Interim Report on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights
1998]
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imposes obligations on States even with respect to transnational corporations
and bodies like the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, and perhaps even the
United Nations Security Council (with respect to economic sanctions against
Iraq, for example).' He acknowledges, however, that States' inclinations to
address such abuses are weak, given the power of such entities in the
international economy. 7
It is important to remember that foreign holders of IPRs that are recognized
under domestic law are subject to a State party's jurisdiction. Thus, all 130
States that are party to the CESCR have international human rights obligations
to ensure that the IPRs recognized in theirjurisdictions are established, granted,
exercised, enforced, licensed, and otherwise used in a fashion that does not
infringe upon the human rights recognized in the two international Covenants.
Moreover, States may have human rights obligations not simply with respect to
acts of violation in their own territory ofjurisdiction, but also in countries other
than their own under international law principles.4" So a State party like
Canada might consider the behavior and activities of a Canadian
pharmaceutical firm gathering crop genetic resources in biologically rich, but
economically impoverished regions populated by indigenous peoples when
determining whether to grant a patent in a biotechnical innovation derived
therefrom.49 As the next part of this Article will explain, this example is not a
far-fetched hypothetical, but touches upon an emerging arena of conflicting
rights in international law.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CONFLICTED CULTURES
Fully meeting human rights reporting requirements may well be onerous.
Even so, many State parties arguably have been less than vigilant in fulfilling
these obligations. To take one simple but telling example, it would appear that
States have failed even to address in their reports progress on the vexing issue
of indigenous peoples' intellectual property and the difficulties faced by
indigenous peoples in having their creative efforts, traditional knowledge, or
Violations, Prepared by Mr. ElHadji Guisse, SpecialRapporteur, Commission on Human Rights, 48th Sess.,
Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/15 (1996).
46. See Leckie, supra note 6, at 111-115.
47. Id.
48. See MEtNO T. KAMINGA, INTER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1992).
49. Whether or not this would raise extra-territorial jurisdiction issues is an important question, but one
that is beyond the scope of this Article.
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expertise recognized and compensated for under existing intellectual property
laws, and the dangers to indigenous peoples' cultural heritage posed by its
appropriation and comodification in the intellectual properties asserted by
others. Such negligence has occurred, moreover, in a context of growing
international awareness of these issues. The United Nations Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, for instance, has issued both a Draft Declaration
making reference to indigenous intellectual property0 as well as a separate
report on the issue."'
Declarations with respect to intellectual property were made and publicized
at several international meetings of indigenous peoples.52 One hundred thirty
50. The Commission on Human Rights of the U.N. Economic and Social Council is an important organ
of the human rights system. The Commission has supervision over the Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Subcommission has several working groups. In 1982, the
Commission and Council approved the establishment ofa U.N. Working Group to focus on indigenous peoples.
The Working Group on Indigenous Populations (more commonly and informally known as the Working Group
on Indigenous Peoples) has become the principal U.N. group concerned with indigenous peoples' rights. Like
other working groups established by the Subcommission, it is comprised of individuals who act in the capacity
of independent human rights experts rather than government representatives. It issues an annual report on the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations. One of its main projects has been the drafting of a Universal
Declaration on Indigenous Rights. See Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res. 1994/5 at
105, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration]. It is now before the Commission
on Human Rights, which has also formed its own working group to consider it. The Draft Declaration is still
controversial and is unlikely to be adopted without amendments. Its explicit inclusion of the right of self-
determination is one of its most controversial provisions, given the reticence ofthe international community of
States to recognize indigenous peoples as peoples in international law.
Part III of the Draft Declaration includes the rights of indigenous peoples to practice cultural traditions
and the right to maintain sites, ceremonies, technologies, and "the right to restitution of cultural, intellectual,
religious and spiritual property taken without their free and informed consent." Id at 109. The land rights
contained in Part VI include "recognition of the full ownership, control and protection of their cultural and
intellectual property" and measures to control, develop, and protect their sciences, technologies, and cultural
manifestations, including human and, inter alia, other genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the
properties of fauna and flora." Id. at 112. To the extent that these rights may become human rights obligations,
either by eventual incorporation into treaty or by virtue of international customary law, intellectual property
rights held by others in innovations that are based upon indigenous resources or knowledge may be called into
question.
51. Particular aspects of indigenous peoples' cultural identity were acknowledged by the Working Group
to require further study. The ecological knowledge, songs, stories, human remains, funerary objects, and other
such tangible and intangible aspects of indigenous heritage were referred to the Working Group Chair, Erica-
Irene Daes, under the sponsorship ofthe U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities. See 1993 Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous
Peoples, U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection ofMinorities, 45th Sess., Agenda
Item 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/13993/28 (1993). The resulting study identifies widespread practices that
have deprived indigenous peoples of tangible and intangible properties central to the preservation of cultural
heritage. See id The study recommends a number of legislative initiatives to correct these practices and
proposes additional measures for greater international cooperation. Id. at 38-42.
52. See, for example, the declarations reprinted in DARRELLA- POSEY ANDGRAHAM DUtFIELD, BEYOND
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countries have also ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity 3 which
mandates recognition of indigenous knowledge and the use of intellectual
property protections in a manner congruent with that end. Finally, a large body
of literature has been published that points to the inadequacies of intellectual
property regimes for the protection of indigenous peoples.' Despite this wealth
of activity and information, IPRs have yet to be fully addressed, incorporated,
and integrated within the range of social, economic, and cultural rights
recognized by CESCR State parties.
There may well be fundamental conflicts among the goals espoused under
the rubric of cultural rights, when viewed through the prism of intellectual
property protections. People's assertions of rights to protection of their cultural
heritage and to a healthy environment may well conflict with others' assertions
of rights to engage in and benefit from progress in science and technology.55 We
are reminded of:
[T]he necessity for States to have a science policy which
encourages development of science in ways which are
beneficial, not counter-productive, to the general welfare....
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
therefore call[s], in its guidelines, on States to not only report
on measures to promote the diffusion of information on
scientific progress, but to also report on measures adopted to
prevent the use of scientific and technical progress for
purposes which are contrary to the enjoyment of all human
rights, including the rights to life, health, personal freedom,
privacy and the like. 6
There is a central ambiguity in the use of the term "culture" in the
international human rights arena, and this ambiguity is at the heart of many
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES (1996) [hereinafter BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY].
53. The Convention on Biological Diversity, openedfor signature June 5, 1992, 31 l.L.M. 822 (1992).
54. For examples, see the essays in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (S.B. Brush & D. Stabinsky eds., 1996) [hereinafter VALUING LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE] and in BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL APPROPRIATION (Bruce Ziff& Pratima Rao
eds., 1997).
55. Eide, Cultural Rights, in TEXTBOOK, supra note 4, at 234.
56. Id. at 235 (citing Philip Alston, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING 69-70 (1991)).
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debates about the scope and propriety of IPRs. There appear to be three
dominant views of culture operating internationally, all suggesting very different
State obligations with respect to IPRs. One common view identifies culture
with the accumulated material heritage of humankind as a whole, or of
particular human groups, including monuments and artifacts. "According to
this position, the right to culture would mean the equal rights of individuals to
have access to this accumulated cultural capital. An extension of this view is
the right to cultural development.""
A second understanding of culture sees it as a process of artistic and
scientific creation; this is congruent with the first view in that the creative
activities of individuals are processes which produce the accumulated cultural
capital of a society.
Within this perspective, the right to culture, of course, means
the right of individuals to freely create their cultural
"oeuvres", with no restrictions, and the right of all persons to
enjoy free access to these creations (for example, museums,
concerts, and libraries). Cultural policies are therefore
directed to further the position of the individual cultural
creator in society (the artist, the writer, the performer), and the
right to the free cultural expression of these creators has
become one of the most cherished human rights in
contemporary times.5
A third view, which is more anthropological, sees culture as the material
and spiritual activities, products, meanings, and values of a given social group
that distinguish it from other groups. 9 This understanding forms what is now
57. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Cultural Rights and Universal Human Rights, in TEXTBOOK, supra note 4,
at 63, 65.
58. Id. at 65-66.
59. Eide, Cultural Rights, in TEXTBOOK, supra note 4, at 230.
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known as the right of cultural identity' and arguably underlies rights of cultural
property." This is not primarily a right of individual enjoyment (although it is
conferred upon individual members of minority groups), but rather is a right to
collectivity. It "can only be enjoyed in community with others and that
community must have the possibility to preserve, protect and develop what it
has in common. '6' As J. H. Burgers suggests, such rights pertain to those who
belong to specific cultures, engage in collective action, share common values,
and perpetuate these values as members of the group.3
These meanings of culture are clearly in a tenuous relationship. If culture
is viewed as the sum total of a society's cultural capital, then "cultural
development" may mean "more culture" in the sense of encouraging more
creative activity, more cultural products, and thus more intellectual properties
(literary, artistic, musical, and cinematographic works as well as technological
innovations). However, if the right to culture is understood as the right to
"one's own culture" then cultural development may have a different meaning.'
Under the third understanding of culture, the right of a group to maintain its
cultural integrity might take precedence over the rights of cultural creators in
the wider society, and the group might choose to restrict access to and use of
elements of its cultural heritage in the expressive and scientific works of others
if doing so was deemed necessary to preserve the group's identity. Certain
exercises ofthese cultural rights and rights to cultural identity, however, might
also be seen to restrict improperly freedom of expression and the free flow of
information in the larger society and thus to violate significant political and civil
rights.
Global institutional divisions of labor reiterate and mirror these conflicting
60. Although cultural rights as such are contained in the CESCR, the most explicit conferral of a right to
cultural identity is contained in Article 27 of the CCPR in the form of a civil and political right bestowed upon
members of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities to collectively enjoy their own culture. According to a
1994 General Comment issued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee, this is an additional right
conferred upon members of minority groups over and beyond those they enjoy as individuals. See Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., pt. 1, General Comment 23, at 38, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/I/Rev. 1 at 38 (1994). See
also S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLEIN INTERNATIONALLAW 97 (1996) (discussing the right to cultural
identity as it pertains to indigenous peoples).
61. See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998).
62. Stavenhagen, supra note 57, at 67.
63. See J. Herman Burgers, The Function of Human Rights as Individual and Collective Rights 63-74,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN APLURALISTWORLD: INDIVIDUALS ANDCOLLECTIVITIES 63-74 (Berting et al. eds., 1990)
for a discussion of the legitimacy and necessity of recognizing collectivities as rights-holders.
64. Id.
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understandings of culture and their lack of reconciliation. Institutionally, what
we might deem "the field of culture" is divided between UNESCO, whose
approach to culture stresses its collective attributes, and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), which has historically put emphasis on
individual creation and public diffusion. For example, one of UNESCO's
primary concerns is international cooperation in the preservation of the cultural
heritage of mankind. UNESCO asserted the right to develop a culture and
proclaimed a "right to cultural identity" at the World Conference on Cultural
Policies in 1982.65 The protection and promotion of the cultural rights of
persons belonging to minorities is also within UNESCO's field of authority.66
With respect to science, technology, arts, and knowledge, UNESCO emphasizes
sharing and cooperation:
The UNESCO Recommendation on the Status of Scientific
Researchers, adopted in 1974, underlines that each member
State should strive to use scientific and technological
knowledge for the enhancement of the cultural and natural
well-being of its citizens and to further the ideals and
objectives of the United Nations. Member States should
actively promote the interplay of ideas and information among
scientific researchers throughout the world, which is vital to
the healthy development of science and technology...
This has several implications. One of them is the freedom to
be enjoyed by everyone to maintain cultural contacts across
borders, to import and to advocate cultural products, ideas and
visions from other cultures; another is to cooperate in cultural
activities with persons living in other cultural setting[s]; a third
is to achieve international cooperation in protecting the moral
65. The Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies states, inter alia, that:
1. Every culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values since each
peoples' traditions and forms of expression are its most effective means ofdemonstrating
its presence in the world. 2. The assertion of cultural identity therefore contributes to the
liberation of peoples. Conversely, any form of domination constitutes a denial or an
impairment of that identity.
WorldConference on CulturalPolicies, FinalReport, U.N. ESCOR, November 1982,.U.N. Doc. CLT/MD/l.
66. According to Article 1(2), of the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation,
adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on 4 November 1966, "every people has the right and the duty
to develop its culture" (cited in Stavenhagen, supra note 57).
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and material benefits from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which the beneficiary is the author; yet another
is international cooperation in protecting the cultural heritage
of mankind.67
Cooperation in the protection of moral and material benefits for the author
across borders is primarily the responsibility of the Geneva-based WIPO.
WIPO promotes protection of intellectual property and supervises the
administrative cooperation between the Paris, Berne, and other international
unions concerning trademarks, patents, and the protection of artistic and literary
work. WIPO, however, has not historically been sympathetic to the concerns
of minorities and indigenous peoples. Indeed, less than a decade ago, the
Director General of WIPO informed the United Nations Human Rights Centre
that it did not recognize the standing of indigenous peoples in intellectual
property matters; a 1991 letter insisted that "intellectual property is
distinguished by the type of intellectual creation and not by the groups
responsible for its creation. This position reflects WIPO's insistence on
individual authorship as a prerequisite for protection."6
Although potentially impossible to ascertain and verify, it may be
hypothesized that this traditional international division of labor between
UNESCO and WIPO historically accounts for the failure to consider measures
necessary to balance rights to individual intellectual properties, rights to public
diffusion, and rights to the preservation of cultural identity. For example, to the
extent that patent rights may encourage secrecy rather than sharing of
technology (in the early stages of technological development so as to avoid
patent preemption), and collectively-held knowledge that may be constitutive of
cultural identity is freely appropriable, to the detriment of collective cultural
heritage, in individual authorship of works of intellectual property, the discrete
mandates of the two bodies may have foreclosed necessary reevaluations of the
scope of cultural and intellectual property rights.
67. Eide, Cultural Rights, supra note 20, at 236-38.
68. Audrey R. Chapman, Human Rights Implications of Indigenous Peoples' Intellectual Property
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A SOURCEBOOK 209,215 (Tom Greaves
ed., 1994). 1 am assured by Canadian government officials in the Intellectual Property Policy Directorate that
under its new Directorship, WIPO has indeed changed its position in the wake of the increased pressure for
recognition of indigenous people's traditional knowledge and cultural heritage. However, I have been unable
to locate any documentary evidence for this.
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III. INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: THE PROPERTIES OF. CULTURE
Recent debates about the extension of intellectual property protections to
include forms of indigenous knowledge as a means of preserving biological and
cultural diversity suggest that different perspectives on the nature of culture
tend to lead to the adoption of diverging positions on the viability of further
extending intellectual property protections for these purposes. Even the initial
premise that there are bounded domains that can be identified as discrete fields
of indigenous knowledge presupposes an understanding of culture as systemic,
territorially bounded, and distinctive. As Stephen Brush suggests, a broad
definition of indigenous knowledge would encompass all folk or popular
knowledge (as distinguished from formal, documented, or specialized
knowledge) that is preserved in oral traditions and local practices.69 A narrower
and more acceptable definition, he suggests, does not include all informal
knowledge, but only the knowledge systems of indigenous peoples and minority
cultures.7" A narrower, but still imprecise definition is provided by Canadian
legal consultant, Howard Mann:
Indigenous knowledge [IK] as a concept concerns information,
understanding, and knowledge that reflects symbiotic
relationships between individuals, communities, generations,
the physical environment, and other living creatures, and the
spiritual relationships of a people. IK evolves as ecosystems
and other factors change, but remains grounded in the more
enduring aspects of identity, culture, generations and
spirituality.7
There is no doubt that oppositions between dominant and indigenous
cultures are often over-simplified, blurring the actual fluidity and permeability
of knowledge and cultural boundaries. Just as dominant cultures appropriate
knowledge from indigenous ones, indigenous knowledge itself contains
knowledge shared between cultures, as well as information brought by colonists,
69. Steven B. Brush, Wf'hose Knowledge, Whose Genes, Whose Rights? in VALU NG LOCAL KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 54, at 4-5.
70. Id.
71. Mann, Intellectual Property Rights, Biodiversity and Indigenous Knowledge: A Critical Analysis in
the Canadian Context. Prepared for the Canadian Working Group on Articles 8 (j) of the Convention on
Biological Diversity, November 1997, at I [hereinafter Canadian Context] (on file with author).
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settlers, and traders. One cannot counterpose absolutely global scientific
knowledge with local indigenous knowledge-people everywhere have access
to both and use them in conjunction." Although contemporary social science
acknowledges the reality of the exchange of information between cultures and
the cultural hybridity of most innovation, the law and legal activists have a
tendency to "reify knowledge systems and set artificial boundaries around
culture where none exist in everyday life."73
In social contexts of inequality, the idea of cultural boundaries makes it
easier to locate, identify, and decry especially egregious forms of expropriation.
Nonetheless, to the extent that cultural boundaries may become rigid and
impermeable by virtue of their legal recognition, the movement of ideas may be
thus imperiled, eventually threatening prospects for cultural evolution. Indeed,
some commentators on the movement toward protecting indigenous people's
cultures through claims of intellectual property have warned that such
developments threaten more fundamental human rights such as freedom of
speech, freedom to share information, and the need for access to a vital public
domain, all of which are necessary freedoms in democratic societies.74 Indeed,
many North American intellectual property scholars have decried the reckless
expansion of IPRs in Western societies to the detriment of the public interest
and democratic values." Critics of proposals to extend IPRs to indigenous
peoples argue that this augers further in the same undesirable direction.76 Such
72. Arun Agrawal, Dismantling the Divide Between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge, 26
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 413 (1995); Paul Sillitoe, Reply, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 246 (1998);
untitled comments on Paul Sillitoe by Roy Ellen, Carmen Ferradas, and R.L. Stirrat, The Development of
Indigenous Knowledge: A New Applied Analogy, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 223 (1998); INDIGENOUS
ENVIRONMEWTAL KNOWLEDGE AND rrs TRANSFORMATIONS (R. F. Ellen et al. eds., 1998).
73. Brush, supra note 69, at 6.
74. For a recent debate asserting and contesting these allegations see Michael Brown, Can Culture Be
Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 193 (1998) (followed by comments by J. A. Barnes, D.
Cleveland, R. J. Coombe, P. Descola, L.R. Hiatt, J. Jackson, B.G. Karlsson, D. Posey, W. Powers, L. Rosen,
F. Granero, S. Severi, S. Stephenson, M. Strathern, D. Tuzin and response by M. Brown); see generally GAIL
K. SHEFFIELD, THE ARBrTRARY INDIAN: THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT OF 1990(1997); D.J. Stephenson,
A Comment on Recent Developments in the Legal Protection of Traditional Resource Rights, 16 HIGH PLAINS
APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGIST 114 (1996).
75. This literature is enormous. A great deal of it is cited and discussed in Coombe, supra note 6 1. See
also JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS (1996); J. Boyle, The Politics of Intellectual
Property (University of Toronto Legal Theory Workshop Paper, 1997) (unpublished, on file with author);
David Fewer, Constitutionalizmg Copyright, 55 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1997, at 175; D. Fewer, Defining
-the Public Interest in Canadian Intellectual Property Policy (1997) (unpublished L.L.M. Thesis, University of
Toronto) (on file with author); David Lange, Copyright and the Constitution in the Age of Intellectual
Property, J. INTELL. PROP. 1993-94, at 119.
76. See Brown, supra note 74.
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concerns may exaggerate and overestimate the claims that indigenous peoples
are themselves making.
As many of the leading experts in the field have noted, when indigenous
peoples engage the issue of intellectual property, they "tend to employ the
political discourse of human rights: rights to land, territory, and resources;
rights to full disclosure and prior informed consent; rights to cultural integrity
and customary practices; and rights to equitable benefit-sharing and control
over access to traditional resources.""' The issue of intellectual property has,
for many indigenous peoples, been an effective rhetorical vehicle to keep issues
of autonomy and self-determination on the global bargaining table.
Increasingly, however, IPRs appear to many indigenous peoples to be an
obstacle rather than an aid to the integrity of their cultures and political
aspirations. For example, in the United Nations Development Programme
Consultations on the Protection and Conservation of Indigenous Knowledge in
Sabah in 1995, some "Basic points of agreement on the issues faced by the
indigenous peoples of Asia" were drafted.7" Asian indigenous peoples'
deliberations put primary emphasis on self-determination and asserted:
[T]he indigenous peoples' struggle for self-determination is a
very strong counter-force to the intellectual property rights
system vis-a-vis indigenous knowledge, wisdom, and culture.
Therefore, the struggle for self-determination cannot be
separated from the campaign against intellectual property
rights systems, particularly their applications on life forms and
indigenous knowledge.79
In this document of agreement, IPRs are represented as "Western,"
threatening, and exploitative. They are described as "a new form of
colonization" and "a tactic by the industrialized countries of the North to
confuse and to divert the struggle of indigenous peoples from their rights to land
and resources on, above, and under it."8
It has been suggested that in communities not fully integrated into market
economies, intellectual property is a concept that divides the intellectual from
77. POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 52, at 211-12.
78. Id. at 219-22.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 219-20.
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the material, texts from their contexts, and knowledge from social
relationships-all of which are inappropriate separations in such areas:
The expression "intellectual property rights" makes it appear
as if the property and the rights are products of individual
minds. This is part of a Western epistemology that separates
mind from body, subject from object, observer from observed
and that accords priority, control, and power to the first half
of the duality. The term "intellectual" connotes as well the
knowledge side and suggests that context of use is
unimportant. The knowledge for which intellectual property
rights can be obtained is generalizable. Thus, while particular
medicines and foodstuffs may have been developed for specific
uses in one society, the category intellectual property rights
suggests that they have more fundamental features which can
be abstracted, written in technical form, and put to use
anywhere. 8
Drawing examples from across Latin America, anthropologist Stephen
Gudeman suggests that in a community economy (one that is only partially
integrated into a market economy and governed by communal orientations
toward sharing, reciprocity, and the maintenance of social solidarity)
innovations are cultural in nature. They are products of the group that emerge
from practices of trial and error to meet practical shared needs.8 2 Holding a
"commons" of land, material resources, knowledge, ancestors, animate and
inanimate beings, and practices with respect thereto is what a community shares
and is the source of its maintenance as a community (or a "culture"). This
commons is built up of prior innovations and provides the means for developing
new ones. IPRs, Gudeman asserts, are merely another dimension ofthe market
forces that threaten further to erode and appropriate an already endangered
commons.83
The consideration of indigenous knowledge in an intellectual property
context may be inappropriate to the extent that:
81. Stephen Gudeman, Sketches, Qualms, and Other Thoughts on Intellectual Property Rights, in
VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 54, at 103.
82. See id. at 104.
83. See id.
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[T]he expression "intellectual property rights," with its
emphasis on mind, connotes abstraction, decontextualization,
formalization, and the use of written information. Through the
concept of intellectual property rights we deploy widely
accepted Western assumptions. We assume that innovations
as products or processes have a technical essence that can be
identified; once distinguished, this core can be abstracted from
the context of its use, converted to a written form, transported
home and tested in a laboratory. The implication is that local
knowledge, if it is valid local knowledge, can be restated
within a scientific and general language that we possess. If
local knowledge cannot be fitted to this discourse, it must be
faulty. . . . The scientists draw a distinction between res
cogitans (thinking being without spatial extension) and res
extensa (material things as extended substance)-between the
mental and the material, intellect and emotion, knowledge and
context."
It is precisely the lack of such distinctions that defines most indigenous
knowledge. To the extent that such knowledge is cultural, it is also contextual.
This is not, however, to assume that all such knowledge has this quality, but to
suggest that IPRs, to the extent that they are premised upon such conceptual
distinctions, may not be the best means of protecting knowledge that has
radically different principles of generation and practice. Knowledge that is
dynamic and constantly changing is not protected by freezing it in written form.
Moreover, innovation in such knowledge may depend upon sharing and the free
flow of innovations within the community and between communities. In such
instances, drawing the lines between common knowledge or public domain and
private expression or innovation that are anticipated, enabled, and ensured by
IPRs, will have a tendency to slow larger communal developments by affecting
what the surrounding community can do with the new knowledge.
Community held rights might be an appropriate solution here, but as
Gudeman recognizes:
[S]hifting innovation rights from individual to group does not
fully solve the equity issue, for this presumes that communities
84. Id. at 112-13.
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are integral units, and in today's global world, bounded
communities and cultures can hardly be found! Transmission
of cultural information across social borders is not new-it has
been a species practice since earliest times-but the rate and
scale of diffusion have quickened; the borders of old
communities have begun to dissolve, while new types of
communities are developing. 5
People travel between communities, taking knowledge with them and
incorporating it into local knowledges (or cultural frames of reference) which
are then transplanted to new contexts. This fluidity of knowledges across
porous borders of complexly layered communities makes IPRs difficult to
delineate and to control. However, such objections may be overstated; fair use
exemptions for noncommercial uses or those which do not involve mass
reproduction of articles for commerce could be incorporated into any new or
revised legal regime to ensure that ordinary forms of knowledge transmission
are not seen as forms of infringement. Any new regime of rights will have to
be accompanied by a related set of exemptions that are relevant to the different
forms of knowledge to be protected and their likely uses, if it is to be congruent
with human rights principles.
IV. THE CULTURAL VALUE OF PLANTS
If cultural transplants are common, it is nonetheless the case that some
potentially transportable plants are more firmly rooted in local realms of
meaning and value. The protection to be accorded to plants of asserted cultural
significance is another area in which cultural rights, IPRs, and civil and political
rights are likely to come into tension. Some indigenous activists have suggested
that folk varieties 6 be considered part of the cultural heritage of local
communities and thus considered neither common heritage resources nor
national patrimony. This would make them akin to a kind of folklore.
85. Id. at 116.
86. "Folk crop varieties, also known as land races or farmers' 'traditional' or 'primitive' varieties, are
.geographically or ecologically distinctive populations which are conspicuously diverse in their genetic
composition both between populations and within them."' D. Cleveland & S.C. Murray, The World's Crop
Genetic Resources and the Rights of Indigenous Farmers, 38 CuRRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 477, 480 (1997)
(citing A.H.D. Brown, Isozymes, Plant Populations, Genetic Conservation, 52 THEoRETIcAL AND APPLIED
GENETICS 145 (1978)).
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Unfortunately, few countries have to date passed folklore legislation. Many
indigenous peoples, moreover, do not want such folklore to be managed by the
State, as is currently anticipated in international legal frameworks for the
protection of folklore. The proposed Model Provisions for National Laws on
the Protection of Expressions of Folklore recognizes the legal rights of
communities in forms of folklore, which are defined as "traditional
manifestations of the culture which are the expression of their national
identity. 87 It has been proposed that some folk varieties could be protected
under this law, and it is suggested that indigenous crop varietigs be nominated
"folk varieties" rather than land races or traditional varieties for this reason.88
In 1989, UNESCO adopted a recommendation that the model law become an
internationally binding convention, but it has yet to receive worldwide attention.
WIPO promises to attend to folklore in the near future, and the protection of
crop varieties is then likely to be addressed. Certainly many indigenous
declarations suggest that traditional plants and plant knowledge are viewed as
subject to the cultural rights asserted by indigenous peoples. The inclusion of
plant varieties in protected domains of folklore will only have legitimacy,
however, if indigenous peoples themselves are centrally involved in defining
those crop genetic resources that are central to cultural identity. The United
Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples89 also includes
rights to seeds, genetic resources, and knowledge of the properties of fauna and
flora, although the likelihood of this Draft Declaration being internationally
adopted looks ever more remote.
Although none of the above efforts to have plant varieties or crop genetic
resources recognized as forms of indigenous intellectual or cultural property are
guaranteed to be successful, from a human rights perspective, provisions should
be made in both patent and plant breeders' rights regimes to anticipate such
outcomes. For example, as particular crop varieties become asserted or
identified as central to indigenous cultural identity, it might be possible to put
a moratorium on patent and plant breeders' rights applications that use or draw
upon such resources until the cultural status of such resources is determined.
One difficult question arises when such resources are derived from public
collections rather than from local communities. Will indigenous peoples have
87. Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (LJNESCO-WIPO, 1985).
88. See Cleveland and Murray, supra note 86; Hope Shand, There is a Conflict Between Intellectual
Property and the Rights of Farmers in Developing Countries, 4 J. AGRiC. & ENVTL. ETHIcs 131 (1991).
89. See supra note 50.
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any rights over germplasm stored in seedbanks or other ex situ databanks? As
many experts have cautioned, many samples from medicinal plants identified
through traditional knowledge are now in the public domain:
Even in instances in which stocks of the natural source
material are required for commercial production, the source is
more likely to be an ex situ plantation than the original habitat.
Thus, indigenous genetic resources are nonrival goods; one
person's possession of a breeding stock or a chemical
"blueprint" does not necessarily preclude another's. 0
Absent a legal right to prohibit reproduction, of course, this is true of all
products of intellectual effort; this is precisely why IPRs are commonly
understood to be necessary incentives to invest in the creation and dissemination
of such works. The fact that many works of genetic resource development have
been taken out of their locations of original authorship or invention should no
more disentitle their authors from exercising IPRs than does the international
circulation of protected art, literature, and technological innovation.
More difficult questions are posed bythe numerous varieties of traditional
and hybrid crops that are drawn upon in contemporary crop breeding. Two
issues will require consideration. The first arises from the likelihood that in the
development of a commercially viable hybridization, the contribution from any
single folk variety will be difficult to discern.9 This seems, however, to pose
primarily evidentiary challenges relevant to valuation and accounting which are
hardly unique to this situation; it would not seem to be a significant objection
to the validity of recognizing the right in the first instance. A second issue
poses more fundamental challenges. To the extent that any singular traditional
crop variety may be located in several localities, across a number of different
societies, arguments based upon the cultural significance of a variety may seem
less persuasive. No doubt, as the controversy over ayahuasca in the
Amazonian region indicates, one folk variety may have cultural significance that
is regionally shared among a number of indigenous groups. This poses fewer
problems than the potential situation in which a folk variety found in a number
90. R. David Simpson et al., The Commercialization ofIndigenous Genetic Resources as Conservation
and Development Policy, in PROTECTION OF GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY: CONVERGING STRATEGIES 129, 131
(Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Jeffrey A. McNeely eds., 1998) [hereinafter CONVERGING STRATEGIES].
91. See Brush, supra note 69, at 9.
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of different locations has cultural significance in some, but not all of the areas
in which it is known and cultivated. To the extent that the organism and its
properties are available to commercial developers in both sites, will the group
for whom the plant has cultural significance have any claim to control its use
if the genetic resources are extracted from specimens gathered outside of its
own habitat? If a number of groups have engaged in similar efforts to nurture
and develop similar genetic properties in a particular variety, should the group
for whom the variety has cultural or religious significance be enabled, as a
human right, to preclude or control the commercialization of such genetic
resources by others for whom the plant and its qualities have no such values?
In such circumstances, it is clearly evident that rights of religion and cultural
identity may come into conflict with the rights of others to subsistence,
livelihood, and to benefit from progress in the arts and sciences.
In the contemporary context of widespread claims of "biopiracy," it is
important to keep in mind that few, if any, grants of patents in biotechnological
innovations drawing upon landraces, preclude indigenous peoples from
continuing to use folk varieties or otherwise interfere with such usages. Even
the most expansive patents, like the Agrcetus cotton patent, which asserted
exclusive rights over all genetically engineered cotton regardless of the method
used, do not deny farmers the rights to use traditional varieties. Such patents
are widely condemned because they threaten to stifle innovation and block
exchange of information, but:
[T]he typical claim of indigenous "intellectual property"
relating to folk varieties seeks even more expansive monopoly
control. A plant breeder's right gives the breeder limited rights
to control the use of a distinct variety for a limited period of
time; at the end of that time, all others are completely free to
use the variety. At no time does the community or the country
in which the variety was developed have any proprietary
rights. Similarly, a patent gives the inventor an exclusive right
to use a specific invention for a limited time. . . . This
innovation continues to enrich the lives of billions of people
and serves as a basis for continuing incremental innovations.
... In contrast, a number of advocates of "farmers' rights"
hold that communities in which useful folk varieties or
indigenous knowledge have originated should maintain the
exclusive right to control their use in perpetuity, whether they
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were developed 10 years ago or 1,000. They do not explain
why such a community should be entitled to a special right not
available to others whose inventive predecessors gave the
world comparable benefits. Because it is difficult to establish
a moral basis for such a distinction, the human rights-based
rationales for indigenous intellectual property rights are
unlikely to succeed.'
Recall that human rights are indivisible. Even if rights to genetic resources
and indigenous knowledge may in some instances be considered integral to
cultural identity, and thus as cultural rights recognized in international human
rights law, these cultural rights must still be reconciled with others, such as the
rights of all to share in progress in the arts and sciences, and the rights to have
information shared as well asto have compensation for the fruits of one's labor.
What if it could be demonstrated empirically that the introduction of
biotechnologically engineered and patented seeds into a particular region created
a threat to biodiversity such that traditional subsistence livelihoods and cultural
identities were endangered?93 Should the recognition of lPRs give way to rights
to subsistence and rights of cultural integrity? What precisely would this entail?
No assertion of a human right that fails to consider the range of human rights
into which such a right must be accommodated is tenable. Nonetheless, we
cannot merely ignore the challenge of formulating norms, standards, and
mechanisms to govern the interaction between our intellectual property regimes,
folklore regimes, and human rights commitments.
One dilemma that would seem to require coordination at the international
level between those charged with administering the collective and individual
manifestations of culture involves the granting of recognition to indigenous
plant breeders. One of the biggest drawbacks of both patents and plant variety
protection, in terms of protecting indigenous knowledge, is the inability ofthese
legal regimes to accommodate evolving lines. The intellectual property
protections, used to reward people with relation to plant resources, define
"innovations as tangible changes in plant genetics or management which were
92. David R. Downes, Untitled Comment on Cleveland and Murray, The World's Crop Genetic
Resources and the Rights of Indigenous Farmers, supra note 86, at 499.
93. The possibility that the introduction ofbiotechnologically engineered seeds into the environments of
the original land races from which they were derived may threaten the continuing viability of the traditional
variety has been suggested, but, needs to be further investigated and documented.
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developed by an individual or corporation over a known period oftime."'94 Such
rights preclude consideration of collectively managed, long-evolving genotypic
shifts in plant resources or incremental advances in management information
about them. More seriously for indigenous cultivators, such rights restrict and
inhibit the sharing of information, which is the very essence ofethnobotanical
knowledge. The problem arises when considering:
[E]nhancements that have occurred largely as a result of
cooperative exchanges and the elaboration of plant-specific
information over generations. While cases of forced or
clandestine transfer of plant germplasm... have been widely
reported, it is less remembered that tribes such as the
Havasupai and Hopi regularly and freely exchanged seeds
when one or more of their communities had their fields
devastated by floods. To intervene today to protect a
"snapshot" of existing knowledge and evolving seed heritages
as one tribe's cultural legacy alone belies this incremental and
serendipitous evolutionary process.95
The ironies here are apparent. By granting monopoly rights to an arbitrary
author, the informally shared heritage of such information is not acknowledged
and the common benefits from its exploitation are lost. Yet, if this collective
heritage were to be acknowledged, such ethnobotanical knowledge might be
legally considered as part of the public domain and thus open to the genetic
manipulations and intellectual property assertions of corporate others without
compensation to the communities of its origin. 6
If human rights were to be recognized as truly interdependent and
indivisible, then IPRs would also have to be compatible with the rights
enshrined in the CCPR. Civil and political rights may, in many circumstances,
come into conflict with the exercise of IPRs. The "right[s] to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion" are among the civil rights recognized in both
Article 18 of the UDHR and Article 18 of the CCPR. For indigenous peoples,
religious freedom may have a more expansive meaningthan those more familiar
94. Gary P. Nabhan, Sharing the Benefits of Plant Resources and Indigenous Scientific Knowledge,
in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 54, at 191.
95. Id. at 192.
96. See id.
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with monotheistic religions may realize. As anthropologist Darrell Posey
recalls:
[A]t a seminar on IPR at the United Nations Human Rights
Convention in Vienna, June 1993, Ray Apoaka of the North
American Indian Congress suggested that IPR are a matter of
religious freedom for indigenous peoples. "Much of what they
want to commercialize is sacred to us. We see intellectual
property as part of our culture. It cannot be separated into
categories as [Western] lawyers would want." Pauline
Tangiora, a Maori leader, agrees: "Indigenous Peoples do not
limit their religion to buildings, but rather see the sacred in all
life. 97
One recent controversy over the registration in the United States of a patent
for the processing and commercialization of Ayahuasca, a plant with sacred
significance for many indigenous peoples in the Amazon, illustrates the
problem. The Coordinating Secretariat of Organizations of Indigenous Peoples
from the Amazon (COICA) resolved in its Fifth Congress in Georgetown in
1997 to condemn the issuance of a patent to Loren Miller, owner of the
International Plant Medicine Corporation, a pharmaceutical laboratory with
headquarters in the United States. The resolution was adopted by eighty
delegates representing 400 groups of indigenous peoples from nine Amazonian
countries and was greeted by protests from the Inter-American Foundation, who
demanded its retraction. In March 1998, COICA responded to this request in
no uncertain terms:
The Amazonian indigenous peoples condemn the actions of
Mr. Miller. We have assumed a sovereign decision as peoples,
as would any other society of the world, that had suffered the
lack of respect for their culture, their customs, their sacred
symbols.... As indigenous peoples we do not oppose the
development nor the research to discover new alternatives for
the survival of humanity, but we do want this respect.98
97. POSEY AND DUTFIELD, supra note 52, at 121.
98. Letter and Information on the Sacred Plant Ayahuasca (visited Mar. 13, 1998)
<http://www.igc.org/igc/econet/h/98031222360/h I 8.html>.
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Pointing to a large bibliography of literature that affirms the sacred character
of the plant to Amazonian peoples to substantiate their assertion of the plant's
spiritual significance, COICA emphasized the magnitude of the offense to
indigenous peoples for a single person to purport to appropriate, assert
proprietary rights in, and derive monetary benefit from such a sacred symbol.
The "new variety" that Miller purports to have "discovered" is, according to
COICA, "a variety of banisteriopsis domesticated by our peoples hundreds of
years ago. '"" There is no evidence that Miller received permission from the
Equadorian government, nor that the sample was removed with the prior
informed consent of the indigenous peoples from whose smallholdings it was
taken. Do rights to practice one's religion include rights to prevent the
commodification by others of things which adherents to that religion hold
sacred? As a human rights issue, this remains to be resolved, but it is an area
of likely future tension as the "cultural rights" of some intellectual property
holders come up against the civil and political rights to religion and cultural
identity asserted by others. Such a dilemma also points to the multiple places
in which sovereignty is located and claimed in disputes over culture and
intellectual property.
V. THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Consideration of the use of IPRs to advance the objectives of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) graphically illustrates the
problematic centrality of State sovereignty in the international human rights
arena. The Convention on Biological Diversity was completed in 1992 and
entered into force in 1993.11 The CBD is an example of the recognition that
environmental issues are global in scope and implication. It represents the latest
in a continual pattern of erosion of the domain of domestic jurisdiction in
matters pertaining to the environment. The CBD addresses the conservation
and sustainable use of nature based on the concept of biological
diversity-often described as "the total variety of genetic strains, species, and
ecosystems..... In the Convention it is defined as "the variability among living
organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other
99. Id.
100. Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
supra note 53, at 818.
101. Caring for the Earth at 28, U.N. Doe. IUCN/WWF/UNEP (1991).
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aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part: this
includes diversity within species, between species and ecosystems."'' 2 This
broad definition includes diversity in both natural and human habitats and
encompasses variety within domesticated species as well as wild ones.
The CBD provides an opportunity to break the obvious nexus between
biodiversity and poverty. Recognizing that we cannot expect to conserve
biodiversity by keeping people poor, it is also clear that "historically
biodiversity survived only under such conditions." 3 Only by providing
livelihood prospects with respect to the conservation of biodiversity can we
expect the stewardship of the environment to survive. To the extent that the
CBD attends to subsistence rights and rights to benefit from innovation as well
as rights to maintain and develop cultural heritage, it is congruent with a variety
of established human rights norms. The CBD evolves naturally out of prior
developments, consolidating and affirming existing principles of human rights
protection pertaining to the environment, cultural integrity, and resource rights.
Indeed, the CBD's provisions "help to affirm indigenous peoples' moral and
political claims to lands, natural resources, and knowledge."1
4
An international human rights perspective on the protection of indigenous
knowledge through IPRs would presuppose that State governments not only
have obligations to indigenous peoples subject to their own jurisdictions, but
also that these obligations involve respect for and protection of the indigenous
knowledge of indigenous peoples (including forest dwellers and marginalized
tribal groups) globally. Hence, any use of IPRs as mechanisms to address the
protection of indigenous knowledge and biodiversity must be attentive to the
consequences of such protection for peoples in other regions of the world. State
parties to the CBD must attend to the protection and conservation of
biodiversity outside of the State's jurisdiction to the extent that this may be
integrally related to the cultural integrity, environmental protection, and
property rights of indigenous peoples across the globe.
Given that most States' intellectual property laws protect the rights of
foreign holders of IPRs pursuant to international conventions and prevailing
102. Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 2 of Preamble, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, supra note 53, at 823.
103. Anil K. Gupta, Getting Creative Individuals and Communities Their Due: Framework for
Operationalizing Article 8 and 1OC [1], (Draft paper invited by CBD Secretariat, 1997),
<http://csfColorado.edu/sristi/papers/getting.html>.
104. David R. Downes, Global Trade, Local Economies, and the Biodiversity Convention, in
BIODIVERSrry AND THE LAW 203 (W. J. Snape ed., 1996).
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trade agreements, these rights-holders are subject to these State parties'
jurisdiction. International human rights law obliges State governments to
ensure that such rights are exercised in a manner that does not entail violations
of human rights. Full recognition of the human rights implications of the use
of IPRs to protect and compensate indigenous knowledge to the end of
protecting biological diversity must therefore involve more than the addition of
new protections under existing domestic intellectual property regimes. It may
compel a more thorough reevaluation of the protections granted to conventional
rights-holders, an examination ofthe research and development conditions that
gave rise to the works for which IPRs are claimed, and denials ofor restrictions
upon such rights when research and development conditions appear to conflict
with human rights obligations and where the enforcement of such IPRs violates
or threatens to violate human rights. Although it is beyond the scope of this
Article, such a reevaluation must also be congruent with a State's obligations
pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement. The difficulties of reconciling obligations
under the CBD and under TRIPS do not appear to be insignificant. In the first
instance, it has been suggested that:
[W]ith respect to traditional knowledge and informal
innovation practices of indigenous peoples and local
communities, the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)
states that new forms of protection adapted to the particular
circumstances of local and indigenous communities do not fall
within the purview of TRIPS since they were not discussed
during the negotiations.'
This assessment, however, only affects new and additional forms of IPRs.
It does not address the more fundamental conflicts likely to arise between
existing IPRs and indigenous peoples' claims. Many scholars nonetheless
believe that TRIPS has so completely limited the capacities of member States
to adjust IPRs to meet social policy objectives that any attempt to use IPRs to
meet the goals espoused by the CBD is effectively foreclosed. Regardless ofthe
CBD text, they argue, its provisions that deal with IPRs are subject to TRIPS
stipulations that are so restrictive that indigenous peoples' rights cannot actually
105. Committee on Trade and Environment ofthe World Trade Organization, Environment and TRIPs,
WT/TE/W/8, at 2x (1995).
1998]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
be addressed."°t
The CBD embraces the idea that traditional indigenous techniques and
knowledge are essential to the preservation of biodiversity and sustainable
development. The Convention directs the signatories to find means to "respect,
preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and
local communities embodying traditional lifestyles."'0 7 The recognition of
indigenous peoples' knowledge and its role in the conservation and sustainable
use of biological resources corresponds to the complementary recognition that
the preservation of biodiversity and the preservation of cultural diversity are
integrally related.' As Anuradha puts it, "[t]he juxtaposition of biological
diversity and cultural diversity among local communities is not a coincidence:
the latter has arisen as a human adaptation to the former and has in turn
nurtured it."'"
The area of indigenous knowledge relevant to the CBD is the indigenous
knowledge "relating to the quality and condition of the environment and the use
or conservation of biodiversity.""' IPRs were early and enthusiastically
embraced, at least by Western scholars and activists, as a solution to the
problem of biodiversity preservation, indigenous cultural integrity, and global
needs for genetic resources necessary for biotechnology."' The proposal that
indigenous knowledge be treated as a form of intellectual property was seen to
provide an incentive to indigenous peoples to maintain environmental
stewardship and to increase their economic return from so doing. This had the
evident merits of promoting both cultural survival and biological conservation.
The theory was that both stewards and users tend to underinvest in conservation
activities when biological resources are public goods and that turning public
goods such as indigenous knowledge and biological resources into private
106. See Surendra J. Patel, Can the Intellectual Property Rights System serve the Interests of
Indigenous Knowledge?, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 54, at 305, 318-19.-
107. Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 80) Preamble, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, supra note 53, at 826.
108. Curtis M. Horton, Protecting Biodiversity and Cultural Diversity Under Intellectual Property
Law: Towarda New International System, 10 J. ENvTL L. & LITIG. 1, 2-3 (1995); see Gupta, supra note 103.
109. R.V. Anuradha, In Search of Knowledge andResources: Who Sows, Who Reaps?, 6 REV. OF EUR.
COMM. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 263 (1997).
110. Mann, supra note 71.
111. See generally Michael Huff, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A Question of
Intellectual Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1678 (1995); Elias Peralta, A Callfor Intellectual Property
Rights to Recognize Indigenous People's Knowledge of Genetic and Cultural Resources, in WIDENING
PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERsrrY 287 (Anatole F. Krattiger et al. eds., 1994); Shayana Kadidal, Plants, Poverty,
and Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223 (1993); Mann, supra note 71.
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properties would enable tribal herbalists, shamans, peasant farmers, and
governments to profit from indigenous knowledge and conservation activities.
Because intellectual property rights were conventionally accepted means to
encourage the creation and sharing of intellectual goods, they seemed like an
ideal vehicle to link biological resources with cultural knowledge for larger
public purposes. However, as Stephen Brush explains:
Conserving culture and language is fundamentally different
and more problematic than conserving biological resources.
While indigenous peoples, their advocates, and social scientists
are acutely aware of the loss of cultural and linguistic
diversity, there is no political consensus on how to address this
problem or how to conserve cultural knowledge. The
dynamics of political and social systems make it far more
difficult to design programs of cultural conservation than to
lay out biological preserves or to create botanical gardens,
zoos, or seed banks. Nevertheless, the value of cultural
diversity and its relevance to conserving biological resources
warrant an effort to address the loss of cultural knowledge.
Cultural knowledge cannot adequately be conserved by setting
it aside in a museum, or by recording it on paper or
electronically. Like biological diversity, cultural knowledge
can only be conserved by keeping it alive and in use.
Intellectual property possibly opens a way to harness market
forces to this objective."'
Here, again, the incentive arguments seems strong. If traditional knowledge
disappears as people leave ancestral ways of life, and as more and more rural
and indigenous peoples are drawn into modem capitalist economies:
[C]ultural motivations for maintaining traditional knowledge
disappear. Furthermore, preservation of traditional knowledge
often involves substantial costs, such as the time necessary to
study methods and techniques and to teach them to subsequent
generations.... Knowledge holders will have little incentive
to maintain traditional knowledge if they cannot internalize the
112. Brush, supra note 69, at 1, 4.
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resulting benefits, even though the overall societal benefits
may exceed the cost of maintaining the knowledge. Few young
people in areas of rich genetic diversity study biological
information under shamans and healers, which suggests that
development of a property rights regime is essential to the
preservation of traditional biocultural knowledge." 3
In many parts of the world, incentives will be necessary, not only to conserve
disappearing knowledge, "but also the institutions of its reproduction and
intergenerational transfer."" 4
More recent academic commentaries, statements by NGOs, and
declarations of groups representative of indigenous peoples have, as we have
seen, been far less sanguine about the prospects for an intellectual property-
based solution to biodiversity preservation and compensation due for indigenous
resources and knowledge. Formidable political obstacles and legal barriers face
indigenous peoples who might attempt to use IPRs to have indigenous
knowledge recognized, compensated, and protected. Fundamental aspects of the
global political economy would appear to preclude the viability of using IPRs
as a means of redressing biodiversity loss or assisting conservation efforts:
Economic poverty, exploitation, and biological degradation
coexist in areas with the greatest stores of domesticated and
wild biological diversity. Indeed, these human and biological
conditions are intimately related to one another. Conservation
of biological resources in centers of crop origins and in
tropical forests is in the public interest of people everywhere.
... Effective conservation cannot be planned or accomplished
without addressing the issues of poverty, domination, and
exploitation.... The allure of simple explanations for poverty
and degradation, such as economic exploitation, and simple
solutions for conservation, such as privatizing resources, is
understandable in this climate of urgency.... Unfortunately,
the complex problems of poverty and environmental
113. Craig Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recognizing Property Rights in Traditional Biocultural
tontribution, 16 STANF. ENVTL. L.J. 74, 94-95 (1997).
114. Anil K. Gupta, Rewarding Creativityfor Conserving Diversity in the Third World: Can IPR
Regime Serve the Needs of Contemporary and Traditional Knowledge Experts and Communities in the Third
World? (visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://csf.colorado.edu/sristi/papers/cottier.html>.
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degradation won't disappear with the creation of a new system
of property that brings peasants and tribal peoples into greater
contact with and dependence on industrial nation States. On
the other hand, wealthy societies which depend on the ultimate
source of biological diversity-in farmer's fields, prairies, and
tropical forests-must accept the burden of making
conservation an acceptable alternative. Turning public goods
into private property is now heavily promoted for conservation
purposes. Unfortunately, this is also a high-risk method for
societies and cultures that have long been subordinated.
Privatization of biological resources could result in greater
poverty and exploitation without achieving conservation or
equity. 115
As Michael Dove notes, the premises behind extending IPRs to indigenous
communities overlook significant local political realities. For example, the
assumption that transnational corporations or more developed countries are
unfairly exploiting local communities is exaggerated in comparison to the
exploitation by the political-economic elites of less developed countries who are
far more likely to be engaged in commercial extraction resulting in the resource
degradation that impoverishes local communities." 6 For instance, logging
concessions will have an enormous impact on biodiversity conservation as
indigenous peoples are engaged in protracted struggles to assert land claims to
traditional subsistence and farming areas against corporate interests who are
encroaching on these lands. National governmentsjustify the concessions on
the basis of benefits to the national economy, but such benefits do not make
their way to local communities. Indeed, in many such contexts, local tribesmen
themselves must begin to fell the primary forest and cultivate it in order to
strengthen their future legal claims against the concessionaires." 7 In situations
where basic property rights in lands are still in dispute, the offer of intellectual
property rights appears rather premature, if not beside the point. To the extent
that real property rights are often premised upon precisely the kind of activities
that destroy biodiversity (intensive rather than swidden agriculture, cash
115. Brush, supra note 69, at 18.
116. See Michael R. Dove, Center, Periphery, and Biodiversity: A Paradox of Governance and a
Developmental Challenge, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 54, at 57.
117. Id. at 43.
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cropping rather than subsistence farming), and peoples in these areas are
subject to government and elite pressure to provide immediate foreign exchange
in the struggle against national debt, the long-term benefits of IPRs seem
incredibly remote. Such regions are seen as "commons" in many countries, not
as homes to tribal peoples and ecosystems. By focusing primarily upon
inequities in North-South transfers of genetic biological resources, proponents
ofIPRs have failed to recognize inequities at the national level and exploitation
of resources across less developed countries by transnationally connected
Southern elites. Proposals for in situ conservation which do not look for
solutions beyond local communities and recognize the political context in which
these peoples struggle will inevitably fail. By continuing to locate sovereignty
exclusively at either the nation-state or the possessive individual level, we
reinforce and perpetuate these political economic tensions.
[Anthropologist] Posey calculated that "less than 0.001
percent of the profits from drugs that originated from
traditional medicines have ever gone to the indigenous peoples
who led researchers to them." What we also need to know,
and are not told by Posey, is what percentage of these profits
have gone--or might go under proposed uses of intellectual
property rights-not to these indigenous people but to the
political-economic elites of their countries. We can get some
idea of this percentage by looking at the case of timber. The
percentage of profits from tropical forest logging that goes to
the indigenous inhabitants of these forests is likely similar to
Posey's figure in order of magnitude (and yet the extraction of
timber entails far greater costs for these inhabitants, by
degrading their ecosystem and thus the basis for their
subsistence, than does the extraction of biogenetic
resources)." 8
As many commentators have noted, the link between biodiversity and poverty
in many areas of the world creates political conditions that make it difficult to
ensure that benefits will flow to local communities or to those whose knowledge
and activities are most responsible for those benefits. These are areas that often
have very poor public infrastructure, weak private market forces, where local
118. Id. at 55.
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people are nationally recognized as "unskilled labor" whose flight to urban
areas is nationally encouraged. The prices of goods these people produce,
particularly crops, are especially susceptible to market fluctuations, and as a
result huge variations in income exist. Households often run deficits and
therefore depend upon others, including the informal sector and money lenders
and traders."9 This dependence is often related to political exploitation. It is
common to resort to resource-degrading strategies of commercial extraction or
abandoning farming for wage labor under such pressures simply to meet
livelihood requirements, repay debt, and to secure even minimal access to the
limited forms of available social security. All of these responses to economic
marginalization tend to further erode both biodiversity and the knowledge that
sustains it.
As Michael Dove explains, the need for conservation is greatest in areas of
the world which have the least developed and least accountable political
infrastructures; these are the regions in which pharmaceutical and agrochemical
companies are also least likely to invest.2 Costa Rica's success in promoting
the capitalization of its genetic resources, he suggests, has as much to do with
its stable political institutions as it does to the value of the resources
themselves. 2' Its comparative advantage, in short, may well be its political
structures. Even in Costa Rica, however, little of the compensation has been
invested in conservation, and none of it appears to have benefitted indigenous
communities.
Structural impediments limit the flow of resources to many indigenous
communities in less developed countries. The resource flow into these
communities is not nearly as efficient as the resource flow out of them.'22
Compensation made to national governments is unlikely to reach indigenous
communities. Many centralized States and their elites, particularly in Southeast
Asia, are dependent upon keeping peripheral communities marginalized as sites
for the expropriation of resources. Local and indigenous communities are
nationally seen as outcast ethnic minorities and stigmatized for their
119. See Gupta, supra note 103, at 180.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., R. David Simpson et al., Scales, Polycentricity, and Incentives: Designing Complexity,
in CONVERGING STRATEGIES, supra note 90, at 142.
122. See Dove, supra note 116, at 49.
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backwardness." 3 In many areas of high biodiversity and attendant local
knowledge, national elites have a poor record of making the machinery of
government available to communities, which makes it inadvisable to route
compensation of national or international funds through the State machinery.
Too often, when a resource at the periphery acquires value, elites at the center
of society assume control over it, and in the process, indigenous peoples are
further marginalized, putting more pressure on them to abandon the sites of
biodiversity and practices of knowledge-generation.
Dove cautions that political-economic elites of less-developed countries may
support IPRs because they represent a unique opportunity for North-South
wealth transfer:
[I]t represents an opportunity not to conserve resources but to
appropriate as much as possible of any value realized from
these resources by foreigners. (Failure to distinguish between
these highly disparate goals is a key misunderstanding of the
debate over intellectual property rights.) This does not alone
explain the elite interest in intellectual property rights,
however. Some interest stems from the role that intellectual
property rights may play in broader North-South dialogues:
they potentially provide elites in the less-developed countries
with a way to rebut criticism by the more-developed countries
of their countries' records on environmental degradation and
human rights violations. By accusing the industrialized
nations of extracting without compensation valuable resources
from indigenous people in the less-developed countries, and by
blaming this injustice for all subsequent resource degradation,
the critique is effectively turned back on the critics."4
Centers of greatest biodiversity are usually those least integrated into
market economies, but this is not to say that indigenous peoples cannot
themselves intensify market linkages if they have the political organization and
autonomy to manage these ties for their own benefit. In other circumstances,
123. See generally Stephen B. Brush, Farmers' Rights and Genetic Conservation in Traditional
Farming Systems, 20 WORLD DEv. 1617 (1992); Stephen B. Brush, Indigenous Knowledge of Biological
Resources and Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of Anthropology, 95 AM. ANrTHopoLoGIST 653
(1995).
124. Dove, supra note 116, at 56.
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it may be necessary to enlist NGOs to distribute compensation if it is to serve
the desired ends. Indeed, the lack of identity of purpose between national
agencies and indigenous peoples has been recognized in international
development circles by those who see a greater overlap of interests between
international environmental activists and international movements for local
rights, both of which insist upon international oversight. This is a perspective
that posits a basic division of interest between nation-states and international
corporations on one side, and local communities, international
environmentalists, and human rights activists on the other."2 5 Only by
improving the political position of indigenous peoples will any extension of
intellectual property (or suigeneris regimes) have positive effects. Neither the
sovereignty of the State, nor the sovereignty of the individual rights-holder will
serve in these contexts to protect the interests of indigenous peoples. Indeed,
recognition and respect for State sovereignty seems in many cases inimical to
this goal.
From the perspective of international environmental obligations, the sharing
of benefits realized from the use of resources and biocultural knowledge is the
sole responsibility of the State in whose territory the community lives, and it is
up to the State to ensure that benefits are secured when traditional knowledge
is obtained. It has been noted that "[i]mplementing the environmental rights to
public participation and information and establishing an informed-consent
requirement could greatly assist in this effort."'26 The CBD has been criticized
for not containing any explicit requirement for the consent or participation of
indigenous peoples in access to resources or in the use of indigenous knowledge
and technologies by others.'
The CBD clearly recognizes the sovereign right of States to exploit their
own resources pursuant to national policies. However, this unitary control over
resources must be situated within the Convention as a whole (as well as other
UNCED documents) which seek to narrow the prerogatives of sovereign States
and the sovereignty of property owners "to ensure that biological resources
sustainably serve the ecological and cultural interests of others who depend on
125. See Lee P. Breckenridge, Protection ofBiologicalandCulturalDiversity: Emerging Recognition
of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems Under International Environmental Law, 59 TENN. L. REv. 735,
785 (1992).
126. Diane Shelton, Fair Play Pair Pay: Preserving Traditional Knowledge andBiological Resources,
1994 Y.B. INT'L L. 77, 80.
127. See Mann, supra note 71, at 5; Shelton, supra note 126, at 81.
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them."'2
Although prior informed consent appears to be mandated with respect to the
use of indigenous knowledge, it is less clear with respect to resources. Access
to the resources themselves is subject to the "prior informed consent of the
State providingsuch resources, unless the State itselfdetermines otherwise."129
The provision therefore permits (although it does not require) the State to insist
upon the prior informed consent of indigenous peoples when either indigenous
knowledge or biological resources are used or accessed by others. An insistence
upon prior informed consent is congruent with human rights to cultural
integrity, privacy, property, and emerging rights to environmental protection.
Prior informed consent is a concept that exists in international law. It is found,
for example, in the 1989 Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal as well as in the CBD.
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature's guide to the CBD
describes prior informed consent as consent given by the genetic resource
provider, based on information provided by the potential user, prior to such
consent being granted. 30 Such a requirement gives the party the right not only
to grant access, but also to demand information about the implications of access
and how the genetic resources will be used.
Prior informed consent requirements have been included in collaborative
research agreements, in developing codes of ethics, and in indigenous peoples'
declarations. Indeed, in the United Nations Development Programme Regional
Consultation on Indigenous Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights held in
Suva in 1995, the participants proposed, as part of their plan of action, to urge
governments to "[i]ncorporate the concerns of indigenous peoples to protect
their knowledge and resources by legislation by including 'Prior Informed
Consent or No Informed Consent' (PICNIC) procedures."'31  The
COICA/United Nations Development Programme Regional Meeting on
Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity in Santa Cruz de la Sierra,
Bolivia, in 1994, asserted that "[t]here must be appropriate mechanisms for
maintaining and ensuring rights of indigenous peoples to deny indiscriminate
access to the resources of our communities or peoples and making it possible
128. Breckenridge, supra note 125, at 775.
129. Shelton, supra note 126, at 82 (emphasis added).
130. LYLE GLOwKA ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 105
(Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 30, 1994).
131. POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 52, at 224.
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to contest patents or other exclusive rights to what is essentially indigenous.' ' 2
There appear to be no obstacles preventing State parties to the CBD from
implementing PICNIC requirements as a condition for any and all intellectual
property protections (copyright, trademark, plant breeders' rights, patents, and
industrial designs, for example).' The possibilities of permitting indigenous
peoples to contest the validity of patent rights already recognized in the
jurisdictions of State parties to the CBD pose a more difficult problem. As a
human rights matter, this might violate the civil and political right to property
itself. In jurisdictions where property rights have been recognized as human
rights, however, the right to property has been interpreted to give a wide birth
to governments to determine whether measures that modify or regulate private
property rights are in the general interest. These are generally permissable
providing that there is evidence of government efforts to find a fair balance
between public and private interests."3 Challenges to existing patents held by
foreign nationals, however, might nonetheless also be deemed as deprivations
of property for which compensation is due. 3'
It is important to note that although the CBD affirms each State's right to
control access to its genetic resources, it also requires each party to take steps
to facilitate access for other parties to its genetic resources, but only for
"environmentally sound uses."' 36 This may provide means to prevent access to
resources for biotechnological developments that pose environmental risks.'37
To the extent that the risks posed by the creation offadically new organisms are
unknown, indigenous communities with moral, spiritual, or other objections to
lifeform patenting might be able to use the environmental risk provisions to
preclude access to resources in local communities that are to be used for such
purposes.
Article 15 of the CBD governing access to genetic resources must be read
in the context of the CBD's mandate in relation to local and indigenous
communities. Although all obligations and responsibilities revolve around the
132. Id. at 216.
133. Id. at 47 (detailing an extended definition of Prior Informed Consent).
134. See Allan Rosas, Property Rights, in THE STRENGTH OF DIVERSITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
PLURALISTDEMOCRACY 133 (Allan Rosas & J. Helgesen eds., 1992); J. Frowein, The Protection ofProperty,
in THEEUROPEAN SYSTEM FORTHEPROTECIONOFHUMAN RIGHTS515 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993);
Catarina Krause, The Right to Property, in TEXTBOOK, supra note 4, at 143.
135. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property and Human Rights, in THE TAKING OF PROPERTY
BY THE STATE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 355, 356 (1982).
136. Downes, supra note 104, at 207.
137. Id.
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State, any regime that attempts to implement Article 15 must take local and
indigenous peoples into account, for the simple reason that:
[T]he knowledge of these local communities is intrinsically
linked to the resource itself. Hence there can be no access
regime based solely on a State's control over the resources or
a State's benefit from use of the resources. The fact that
implementation of Article 15 is closely linked to... Article
80) has also been recognized in the decision on access to
genetic resources concluded at the third Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties to the CBD.
Resources, in other words, cannot be appropriated without the concomitant
appropriation ofknowledge. Thus, access to resources should not be addressed
except with regard to the indigenous knowledge concerns addressed in Article
86). 1 Clearly, the two principles of promoting access to resources and
promoting the wider application of indigenous knowledge, innovations, and
practices are closely interrelated. Although approval, consent, consultation, and
compensation are to be observed in both cases, the CBD emphasis is clearly on
the creation of fields of communication and sharing on a level playing field.
Indigenous peoples' desires to preclude access and to maintain secrecy and
close corporate control over resources and knowledge may be justified under
other human rights norms, but they do not appear to be contemplated by the
CBD.
In the body of the CBD, Article 8 on in situ conservation requires each
State to preserve indigenous and local communities' practices and to promote
wider application of traditional knowledge "with the approval and involvement
ofthe holders of such knowledge, innovations, and practices."'"4 It is suggested
that:
[A]pproval connotes the elements of consent, permission and
authorization by these communities before the wider
application of their knowledge, innovations, and practices.
Approval will not make any sense unless it incorporates the
138. Anuradha, supra note 109, at 263.
139. Id.
140. Shelton, supra note 126, at 82 (emphasis added).
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value of the right of these communities to say "no". . . and
further, the right to determine the conditions for the use of the
same and thereby have an element of control and a voice in the
actual application of their knowledge, innovations, and
practices. Involvement connotes an element of active
participation of these communities in the planning process for
the wider application of their knowledge, innovations, and
practices. It goes beyond merely being informed, and implies
the need for active responsible engagement by these
peoples....4 '
Article 8's provisions give legal effect to the intentions expressed in the
Preamble with respect to indigenous peoples. "Implementation of Article 80)
would seem to require each State to identify and document the knowledge,
innovations, and practices of indigenous and local communities, and to conduct
research to determine what constitutes conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity."'4  This accords with provisions in Agenda 21 4 which
state that research and education programs should be aimed at achieving better
understandings of indigenous peoples' knowledge and management experience
related to the environment, and to increasing the efficiency of indigenous
peoples' resource management systems, for example, by promoting the
adaptation and dissemination of suitable technological innovations. The
provisions of Article 8 are also in accordance with Principle 22 of the Rio
Declaration'" that mandates State recognition and support of indigenous and
local communities' identity, culture, and interests, and enable their effective
participation and partnership in the achievement of sustainable development. 45
The third Convention of the Parties to the CBD also puts emphasis precisely
upon the development of capacity-building initiatives with indigenous peoples
to address conservation concerns. 46
141. Anuradha, supra note 109, at 264-65.
142. Id. at 264.
143. Agenda 21 is the program of action for sustainable development that was agreed to at the UNCED
Conference in Rio. Although it is not legally binding, as a text it has moral force and "may subsequently serve
to underpin both national actions and subsequent, possibly more stringent, international agreements in specific
areas." STEVE P. JOHNsON, THE EARTH SuMMrr: UNCED (1993).
144. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Declaration, 1992 (Rio de
Janeiro).
145. Id.
146. UNEP/CBD/COP/3/38, Decision 111/14, Implementation of Article 8 (j), adopted at COP 3.
1998]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
Evidence of prior informed consent might be made a condition for the
granting of IPRs in developed countries. Such an initiative appears to be
necessary to meet CBD objectives. Until a global standard is recognized,
however, evidence of compliance with local governing access regimes appears
to be a minimal, if somewhat insufficient standard. Worldwide, there has been
a significant amount of planning and legislative activity at the regional, national,
and subnational levels dealing with access to genetic resources since the CBD
entered into force. 47 However, much of this legislative activity is merely
enabling and most laws do not clearly establish the principles that access to
genetic resources shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject to prior
informed consent. A much smaller group of countries has passed framework
biodiversity laws that incorporate these principles (Costa Rica, Eritrea, Fiji,
Mexico, and Peru). The only stand-alone national law on access to genetic
resources that has been finalized is in the Phillipines, but the Andean Pact has
created a common regime on access to genetic resources that became law in all
five member States in 1996.148
From a human rights standpoint, requiring compliance with the national
legislation of source countries is a minimal, and arguably de minimus threshold.
Many countries rich in biodiversity will never pass nor enforce such legislation.
Some legislative regimes only deal with wild flora and fauna, which would not
apply to many plant resources of significance to indigenous peoples. The
requirements within relevant national legislation may not respect the rights of
indigenous peoples or local communities to participate in such decisions or to
share in the benefits of resource extraction. Most States, furthermore, are far
from establishing access provisions that address benefit sharing for useful
biochemicals found in the materials for which access is sought. Derivatives,
such as "unimproved or unmodified chemical compounds, other than DNA or
RNA, merely associated with targeted biological material, but formed by the
organism's metabolic processes [may] .. .exist in a sample of biological
material when it is obtained from an in situ or ex situ source.149
Active compounds found within plant materials that have been collected but
which are yet to be extracted, modified and used in a technological application,
have not yet been considered subject to access provisions; but there seem to be
147. See id. (an informal survey listing countries engaging in such activities).
148. Manuel M. Ruiz, Access regimes for Andean Pact countries: Issues and experiences, in AccEss
TO GENErIc REsOuRcEs: STRATEGIES FOR SHARING BENEFrrs 187 (John Magabe et al., eds. 1997).
149. Lyle Glowka, Emerging Legislative Approaches to Implement Article 15 of the Convention on
Biodversity, 6 REv. EUR. COMM. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 249, 253 (1997).
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no particular reasons why they might not ultimately be so governed. Access
legislation may be extended to such derivatives, and perhaps ultimately will be
in many areas. This would regulate access to the materials containing the
chemical compounds just as such legislation regulates access to the genetic
material itself, enabling "appropriate benefit-sharing arrangements to be
negotiated for any subsequent use of the materials taken and used."'5° The
valuation and accounting dimensions of this process should not, however, be
discounted."'
Such accounting and monitoring burdens should only be imposed on those
with the resources and capacities to bear them. Arguably, commercial
developers of genetic resources have access to this information and should be
able to make it available. The developed countries' intellectual property
regimes are one obvious place to put pressure on companies to do so. The
larger policy question is whether or not developed States, party to the CBD,
should also assist indigenous peoples in developing countries that have not put
such legislation into place by precluding patent or plant breeders' rights
protection for innovations based upon such materials if no such access
arrangements for derivatives have been made. From a human rights and CBD
perspective, such a decision would seem to be warranted. Pursuant to the
CESCR, States have obligations to ensure that intellectual property rights are
granted and exercised in a fashion that does not disadvantage indigenous
peoples, minorities, and those who are economically disadvantaged. The CBD
also exorts parties to use IPRs to meet Convention objectives. 5
More difficult questions are posed by the possibility of securing the
extension of access legislation to derivatives such as:
DNA or RNA, or a chemical compound, modified or created
or synthesized from materials originally obtained from an in
situ or ex situ source. The resulting end-product, for example,
150. Id.
151. Waiter V. Reid, Halting the Loss of Biodiversity: International Institutional Measures, in
CONVERGING STRATEGIES, supra note 90, at 168.
152. However, a closer examination of the restrictions posed by TRIPs is necessary to determine how
such a requirement could be drafted and enforced. See Richard G. Tarasofsky, The Relationship Between the
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity: Towards a Pragmatic Approach, 6 REV.
EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'LENv. L., 148 (1997), for an extensive discussion of possible conflicts between the
two agreements. See JAMES CAMERON & ZEN MAKUCH, THE UN BIODIVERSrrY CONVENTION AND THE WTO
TRIPs AGREEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS TO AVOID CONFLICT AND PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
(WWW INT'L 1995).
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might be a breeder's hybrid seed, a traditional healer's
medicine, or a pharmaceutical company's synthesized version
of an extracted biochemical. These, then, are end-products
derived from genetic or biochemical resources through human
intervention."3
As legal expert Lyle Glowka acknowledges, it would be very difficult for
developing countries to extend access legislation to such derivatives because
they would be attempting to regulate the use of technologies outside of State
borders, which would be virtually impossible for the source State to control. 54
Here again, developed countries who are party to the CBD might play a
contributing role through their intellectual property systems, by making such
protections contingent upon benefit-sharing of profits made upon derivatives.
This would greatly assist the market position or bargaining power of developing
countries and local communities in negotiating benefit-sharing arrangements at
the time of access.'
Finally, the access legislation proposed in most developing countries is still
less than optimal from the point of view of access to indigenous knowledge.
Even in areas where indigenous peoples are acknowledged and their knowledge
valued, prior informed consent by indigenous peoples providing such knowledge
has not been legislatively mandated. For example, the Andean Pact countries
"recognize and value the rights and the power of decision of indigenous Afro-
American and local communities over their traditional knowledge, innovations,
and practices associated with genetic resources and derivative processes
thereof,"'56 but there are no explicit provisions referring to the providers' prior
informed consent. In most cases, to the extent that indigenous peoples are to be
safeguarded at all in such processes (so far only in the Andes, the Phillipines,
Fiji, and Eritrea), the State will be responsible for providing consent. As we
have seen, this protection is wholly inadequate for indigenous peoples in many
parts of the world. NGOs may have a role to play here, but it would be
arguably even more politically difficult to make the grant of lPRs in developed
States conditional on compliance with the "soft law" international declarations
153. Glowka, supra note 149.
154. Id.
155. Again, closer attention to the TRIPs Agreement (and possibly interventions into negotiations with
the WTO environmental body) will be necessary to ensure that such amendments were not vitiated as trade
constraints.
156. See Ruiz, supra note 148 (discussing article 7).
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of indigenous peoples' NGOs.
Disclosure requirements may also be formulated to recognize human rights
concerns. Identification of sources for genetic materials, warrants of
sustainable harvesting, and acknowledgment of the involvement of any
indigenous peoples in either locating and obtaining the resource or providing
knowledge about its properties could be required by States granting IPRs, and
penalties could be imposed for misrepresentations in intellectual property
disclosures. Third World activists and NGOs have suggested "[e]very patent
office in a [W]estern country should insist that [the] patent applicant declare
that the knowledge and resources used in a patent have been obtained lawfully
and rightfully.""' Disclosures for plant-based products or other innovations
from indigenous peoples should provide that the source material and knowledge
has been rightfully and lawfully acquired. Lawful acquisition will imply that
prior informed consent and approval and involvement of local communities and
creative individuals have been ensured, assuming that the donor country has
laws requiring such consent and approval. "Ifa country does not have any such
laws,... then acquiring... material (and knowledge) will be lawful ... but
may not be rightful."'58 Rightful acquisition involves ethical inquiries into the
corporation's compensation practices.
This proposal acknowledges the sad reality that many Third World
countries are unlikely to enact prior informed consent legislation that extends
protections to local and tribal peoples. Nonetheless, the argument implies that
the extension of one set of rights (property and cultural rights) to Northern
persons should not be premised upon the denial of the rights to Southern
persons. Since Western governments party to the major human rights
Covenants have obligations to ensure that private parties subject to their
jurisdiction do not violate the human rights of others, such a premise is
congruent with commitments to rights of subsistence, to enjoy the fruits of one's
labor, privacy, environmental sustainablity, and cultural integrity (although not
all of these rights are necessarily implicated in every such taking).
The lawful and rightful disclosure requirement may be awkward, if not
politically impossible, to enforce, especially if it were to be imposed as an
absolute barrier to patent protection. In the shorter term, however, the
requirement to disclose both the lawfulness and the rightfulness of the
appropriation of material and knowledge need not include any minimum criteria.
157. Gupta, supra note 103, at 187.
158. Gupta, supra note 114, at 3.
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For instance, a corporate applicant might simply disclose that the source
country imposed no legal consent requirements, and that it has made no
arrangements for compensation. To the extent that this information is made
part ofthe public record and published by member State governments, it would
provide leverage for indigenous peoples, NGOs, concerned consumers,
interested citizens, and the media to put political pressure on patentholders to
improve their research and development practices congruent with developing
human rights norms. Over time, some corporations might recognize the
publicity values and goodwill to be accrued by greater transparency and might
set increasingly higher standards to develop market distinctions.
VI. FORMS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND COMMUNITY
It would be a gross misrepresentation of global cultural politics to suggest
that all indigenous interest in intellectual property assumes a collective cultural
form. Only recently have indigenous peoples become active participants in the
process of deliberating the scope of IPRs, and participants in the dialogue are
only now becoming fully aware of the full range of meanings and values that
these issues have for indigenous peoples. Perspectives on the issue are far from
homogenous. It appears that there is an emerging division of opinion as to the
viability of IPRs between representatives of indigenous peoples in "the West"
(which appears to encompass New Zealand, Australia, Hawaii, and the Pacific
Islands) and representatives of tribal others (Asian and African groups and
SouthernNGOs representing Third World, rather than Fourth World, interests).
The interests of these groups are substantially different and appear to reflect the
different social and political contexts in which rights are being recognized and
negotiated. Those in the former group have claims as indigenous peoples that
are more fully recognized in national and international law. They have made
IPRs subsidiary to, and an integral part of, their struggles for self-
determination-aspects of their more primary assertions of sovereignty. The
latter group of indigenous peoples face more protracted struggles to have their
indigenous status recognized, both in the States in which they reside and in the
international arena. Legal recognition of their sovereign rights to control
territory and resources appears far more remote; consequentially, they have
taken a more pragmatic view of the potential short-term benefits of IPRs in
alleviating poverty.
For instance, Anil Gupta, speaking for the Society for Research Initiatives
for Sustainable Technologies and Institutions (SRISTI) and other civil society
[Vol. 6:59
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS
NGOs, asserts that the denunciation of IPRs by indigenous peoples' groups
(some of whom have proclaimed all access to biological resources and
indigenous knowledge to be forms of "biopiracy" that commodify and
monopolize communally held knowledge) has been overstated and is often
inaccurate. 9 Local communities and creative individuals in the Third World
need forms of incentives, and recognition for innovation. Intellectual property,
although far from wholly adequate, should not be abandoned as one mechanism
to accomplish this. There is a genuine case for reforming patent regimes and
creating additional alternative frameworks to meet local needs.
Gupta strenuously argues against the proposition that all indigenous
peoples' knowledge be treated as the common property of a collective.
Individual local experts with an abundance of knowledge, practice skills, and
capacities to develop new applications not only exist, he asserts, but in many
parts of the world, they are among the poorest of the poor. In many
communities their knowledge is neither valued, nor respected, and may even be
denigrated as superstitious and insufficiently modern. In such circumstances,
no local incentives exist for them to maintain this knowledge, no opportunities
exist for livelihood options building upon such skills, and there are no
institutions or incentives for the young to learn these practices from their elders.
Providing such individuals with recognition, the possibility of economic benefit,
or even the provision of means to convey and disseminate this knowledge to a
new generation will be necessary to develop indigenous knowledge and conserve
biodiversity in these contexts. The sovereignty of the individual innovator
should be affirmed as a way of furthering local sustainable development.
Gupta believes individual contemporary innovations using traditional
knowledge should be documented, registered, and protected in community
registers."6 Such knowledge and the innovations based upon it need to be
shared among the poor in Third World contexts according to Gupta, and
159. See Gupta, supra note 103.
160. Community registers are NGO initiatives and have yet to receive government or legal approval. For
other discussions of "Community Registers" see Madhav Gadgil et al., Peoples' Biodiversity Register, 1(5)
AMRUTH, Oct. 2, 1996; Graham Dutfield & Utkarsh Ghate, Implementing Article 86) of the CBD Through
Peoples' Biodiversity Registers, 4 BULLETIN OF THE WORKING GROUP ON TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS,
Winter 1997, at 14-16; Conserving Indigenous Knowledge: Integrating Two Systems of Innovation, U.N.
Development Programme (1994); Gurdial S. Nijar, Developing a Rights Regime for Control ofBiodiversity
and Indigenous Knowledge, in PROSPECTS IN BIODIVERSrry PROSPECTING (A. H. Zakri ed., 1995); Berhan
G. Tewolde, A Case for Community Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, COLLECTIVE RIGHTS,
BIODIVERSITY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1, 2 (Institute for Sustainable Development, 1996).
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transnational networks are already in place for this purpose.' 6 ' The Honeybee
Network, for instance, has been involved in documentation, experimentation,
and dissemination of indigenous knowledge, innovations, and practices for at
least sixteen years, working closely with farmers in 2300 villages in Gujarat,
India, as well as in Haryana, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamilnadu, Rajasthan,
and Madhya Pradesh. The Network's documentation of innovations extends to
those coming from Vietnam, Mongolia, Columbia, Ecuador, Tanzania,
Cambodia, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and some South American Indian communities.
This database and network of grassroots innovators serves as a decentralized
method of disseminating important knowledge to other indigenous communities.
Particularly, this
[N]etwork aims to identify innovators who have tried to break
out of existing technological and institutional constraints
through their own imagination and effort. What is remarkable
about these innovations is the fact that they require quite low
external inputs, are extremely eco-friendly, and improve
productivity at a low cost. To date, the [N]etwork has
collected more than 1,400 innovative practices, predominantly
from dry [and marginal] regions, proving that disadvantaged
people may lack financial and economic resources, but remain
rich in knowledge. 6
The Network publishes this knowledge and these innovations in local
languages to be shared by indigenous communities, and every innovation is
sourced to individuals and communities, allegedly to protect any potential IPRs.
The Network newsletter is published in eight languages in Southeast Asia and
currently extends to seventy-five countries. It is emphasized that although the
primary purpose of such networks is to share knowledge among the poor, the
potential exists for this to provide a means of technology transfer from
knowledge-rich to biodiversity-poor areas that will increasingly need sustainable
alternatives to such things as highly toxic chemical pesticides and synthetic
dyes. Technology transfer is a two-way street and the North may ultimately
benefit from the efforts of the South in this regard. For example:
161. See Glowka, supra note 149; Gupta, supra note 103.
162. Gupta, supra note 103, at 180.
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Most countries do not have a fast-track approach for
developing or registering herbal pesticides derived from plants.
Perhaps one answer is a special fund to support formal
research on farmers' innovations in public or private sector
labs, so as to develop a whole range of sustainable and cost-
effective technologies. These technologies may help transform
agriculture not only in developing countries, but also in
economically developed ones lacking traditional farmer
knowledge and creativity. These innovations, therefore, may
not only help transfer technologies between countries in the
South, but from the South to North as well. 63
This knowledge network is seen as complementary to intellectual property
incentives as a means of alleviating the poverty that currently degrades the
people whose activities are the most important in protecting the global
biological heritage."6 Networks like these could be recognized internationally
and administered through the CBD, WTO, or WIPO as an International
Network for Sustainable Technological Applications and Registration
(INSTAR). 165 INSTAR, it is suggested, would serve as a mechanism for
sharing knowledge, attracting investment to innovation, and developing
enterprise activities to convert innovations into products and services to be
diffused by either commercial or noncommercial channels. INSTAR could
"oversee contracts, ensure sustainable extractions, channel information about
innovations to other indigenous communities facing similar ecological
challenges, serve as a clearing house mechanism, and provide the evidentiary
basis for the award of inventor's certificates and risk insurance to develop
value-added products from these innovations."'" It has been suggested that a
network of registers-national registers for local communities, international
registers of folklore and indigenous knowledge, and an international database
to trace germplasm-could serve both as a tracing mechanism and as a means
to ensure that methods and materials in customary use cannot be appropriated
163. Id. at 185.
164. Id.
165. See Anil K. Gupta, Building Upon What the Poor are Rich In: Honey Bee Network Linking
Grassroots Innovations, Enterprise, Investments and Institutions, at 2,
<http://csf.colorado.edu/sristi/papers/building.htmil>.
166. See Id at 4. See also Anil K. Gupta, The Honey Bee Network: Voices from Grassroots
Innovators, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Spring 1996, at 57-60.
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and declared as novel by industrial interests seeking exclusive rights under
intellectual property laws. 167
Patents are the vehicle most often suggested to provide the necessary
incentives for indigenous peoples to preserve biodiversity. However, they are
unavailable for much traditional biocultural knowledge and its applications
because of the requirement that inventions be novel and nonobvious.
Biocultural knowledge that has been known for generations will certainly be
disqualified. Given the high likelihood that such an indigenous invention will
have been published by scientists and Western researchers, this publication may
preclude rights issuing for innovations "derived from that knowledge if the
publication describes the innovation in sufficent detail either to anticipate the
innovation or render it obvious."' 68 It will then be considered prior art. The
publication bar to patenting innovations puts an unfair burden on indigenous
communities who have, historically, been subject to intense scrutiny by colonial
powers, academic researchers, and government agencies and, consequentially
have had little capacity to control their knowledge or its circulation.
Whether indigenous networks themselves do or should afford an obstacle
to recognition of indigneous IPRs, however, is an important point that will need
to be addressed. Gupta seems to assume that public sharing of such knowledge
and its applications will not preclude patent applications by indigenous persons.
Such activities, will more than likely serve to ensure that patent applications for
technologies drawing upon such knowledge will be legally deemed to be
anticipated by virtue of public disclosure.
The publication bar militates against human rights goals of sharing
information, technology, and international cooperation, as well as the allocation
of benefits from progress in the arts and sciences to the greatest number of
people, in a fashion that does not further deprive the already disadvantaged. As
some Third World commentators have recognized, "the publication of local
knowledge deprives on [the] one hand any benefit that may arise from value
addition in local knowledge to the individual or community or nation concerned
and on the other, makes it possible for people struggling with similar problems
to learn from it.' 69
Because the law encourages secrecy and the privatization of knowledge
167. Vandana Shiva, A New Partnershipfor NationalSovereignty, in INTELLECTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS, BIODIVERSITY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS, supra note 160 at paper 3.
168. Jacoby & Weiss, supra note 113, at 96.
169. Gupta, supra note 114.
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until its potential commercial application becomes clear, Third World
innovators cannot share knowledge with others who may desperately need it, nor
can they seek to attract investors who may be able to transform it into a better
source of revenue for local communities. A group like the Honeybee Network
is therefore in a difficult position. Prior to the publication of knowledge in the
newsletter, the Network must attempt to aid either the community or the
individual in establishing a legal right. In most cases, however, the innovation
will not have reached the point of patentability because the capacity for
industrial application remains to be ascertained, and there is little investment
capital available to explore the possibility. In the meantime, the knowledge may
be valuable in alleviating poverty amongst other indigenous and local peoples
and enriching their livelihoods. Third World networks and networks of
indigenous peoples face an untenable choice between not publishing in order to
maintain the potential for future patent benefits, in which case they withhold
useful information from those in dire need of it, or publishing it with the
knowledge that in assisting others, one risks forfeiting the fruits of one's labors.
Such a choice violates human rights norms that encourage the sharing of
benefits, the flow of information, the right to share in progress in the arts and
sciences, cross cultural exchange, and the right to sustainable development and
a healthy environment.
It is imperative that indigenous peoples have the opportunity to register,
document, and disseminate knowledge and innovations among indigenous
communities, without thereby exhausting or precluding the capacity of
innovating communities to profit from the commercial application of such
knowledge. Exceptions could be made in existing intellectual property
legislation that would exempt documentation of indigenous knowledge in
indigenous networks or community registers. One possible means of amending
patent law to recognize this would involve making distinctions between kinds
orforums of publication when determining ifa publication that should preclude
issuing a patent has taken place. The kinds of publication by networks like the
Honeybee might be deemed akin to experimental usages that do not defeat an
innovation's eligibility for patenting. Gupta argues:
Given the high hit rate in formal research around locally
identified uses of plants and other kinds of biodiversity,
transaction costs of formal R and D systems in private and
public systems are reduced considerably. They should in turn
share the benefits that may accrue from commercialization of
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so protected products. In some cases local communities or
individuals... should be considered co-inventors of the new
value added products. The newness and nonobviousness of
a traditional knowledge should be seen in the light of available
repertoire for that particular purpose. The local knowledge
should qualify to be considered new for the purposes of prior
art since outside communities/companies may not have had
access otherwise. The norms regarding exhaustion of the
rights due to publication of local knowledge should be
reconsidered and modified so that incentives to share that
knowledge by local communities with outsiders are not
affected adversely. 7°
CONCLUSION
It should be apparent, even from this brief and far from comprehensive
survey of potential issues, that our regimes of intellectual property protection
might face some fundamental challenges if human rights commitments were
recognized in the granting, enforcement, and monitoring of IPRs. Considering
the interests of indigenous peoples reveals some of the underlying tensions in the
global meaning and value accorded to culture in the field of international human
rights. Intellectual property rights are "cultural" in all of the conflicting ways
in which that concept figures conceptually, socially and institutionally.
Examining the prospects for using IPRs as a means to secure protection for
indigenous knowledge has enabled us to see some of the fundamental political
limitations inherent in a model for allocating rights that recognizes only the
possessive individual orthe nation-state as sites for the exercise of sovereignty.
The increasingly transnational character of economic power, elite
exploitation, indigenous political mobilization, flows of cultural information and
genetic resources, indigenous knowledge sharing, and assertions of cultural
significance suggest that traditional analyses of sovereignty cannot do justice
to the complexities of the networks of power and resistance in which intellectual
properties are increasingly relevant. Intellectual property protections are
becoming more extensive and more pervasive. An acknowledgement of their
status as human rights instruments seems timely, if not urgent, given the
contemporary hegemony of financial and trade considerations in global
170. Id.
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discussions of intellectual property. As a consequence of the Uruguay Rounds,
State sovereignty over IPRs no longer appears especially signficant in terms of
ensuring that intellectual property protections meet domestic public interests.
Nonetheless, States with international human rights commitments retain a
significant power, though largely untapped, to ensure that IPRs serve larger
goals of global socialjustice. NGOs might play an important role in pressuring
them to do so. This is a political opportunity that provides some promising
prospects for new forms of accountability in the global economy.

